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Timeline of Nuclear Events and Changes in Leadership 
 
Bold print indicates a change in leadership  
 
1947 Partition of British Indian Empire  
1955 The United States agrees to share nuclear energy technology with Pakistan 
1956 Pakistan establishes the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)  
1958 President Ayub Khan takes power via a military coup d’état  
1960s  Pakistan accumulates a variety of nuclear technologies for peaceful 
purposes. Pakistani leadership encourages the nation’s top scientists to 
study abroad and gain expertise. 
1965 Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 
1970  Pakistan declines to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
1971 Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 results in the creation of Bangladesh 
1971  Zulfiqar Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party becomes prime minister 
1972  Prime Minister Bhutto meets with top scientists in Multan and concludes 
that Pakistan will pursue a nuclear weapons program 
1974  India detonates “Smiling Buddha” in its first nuclear test 
1974  A.Q. Khan contacts Prime Minister Bhutto about the program 
1975  The PAEC began its initiative to produce highly enriched uranium 
1976  The PAEC and Engineering Research Laboratories split 
1977  COAS General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq overthrows Prime Minister 
Bhutto in a military coup d’état  
1979  The U.S. announces that it will cut aid to Pakistan due to the nation’s 
questionable nuclear activities 
1983  Pakistan cold tests a nuclear device in the Kirana Hills 
1984  A.Q. Khan declares that Pakistan achieved highly enriched uranium  
1988  General Zia-ul-Haq dies in a controversial plane crash 
1988  Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party is elected 
1989 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto travels to the U.S. to confirm that Pakistan 
does not intend to build a nuclear weapon 
1990 Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League is elected to power 
1993 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President G.I. Khan are dismissed 
1993 President G.I. Khan gives the military control of the nuclear weapons 
program as he leaves office 
1993 Benazir Bhutto is elected for a second term 
1997 Nawaz Sharif is elected for a second term 
1998 Both India and Pakistan detonate nuclear devices in a demonstration of 
nuclear capability 
1999 The Kargil War breaks out between India and Pakistan in the first conflict 
since both nations obtained an operational deterrent 
1999 COAS General Musharraf overthrows Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
in a military coup d’état  
2000 President Musharraf establishes the National Command Authority 
2009 Amendments are made to the NCA to remove the president and name the 
prime minister as chairman  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Pakistani nuclear weapons program represents decades of sacrifice, sanctions 
and scientific development. Condemned by the international community and its rival, 
India, the program has also been controversial. For Pakistanis, it embodies the resolve of 
the Pakistani leadership and scientific community to produce one of the greatest 
technological feats of the 21st century: an atomic bomb. However, developing a bomb 
was not without its challenges. This thesis analyzes the relationship between civilian 
leaders and the military throughout the evolution of the program. While the nuclear 
program began under a civilian leader, the program did not remain under civilian control. 
This thesis argues that the inability of the Pakistani political system to produce legitimate 
democratic leadership led the military to assume de facto responsibility for the nuclear 
arsenal and the perceived survival of the nation.   
 Much of the existing literature agrees that the Pakistani military dictates nuclear 
policy, development and management. This thesis analyzes Pakistani civil-military 
relations since partition and examines how this relationship between civilian leaders and 
military officials influenced the development and management of the nuclear arsenal. 
Investigating the historical narrative of Pakistani civil-military relations and the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons program is critical to understanding how the military came to possess de 
facto control of the arsenal.  
 This thesis begins at the partition of the British Indian Empire that formed two 
separate nations, India and Pakistan, in 1947. The objective of the first chapter is to give 
some historical context to the Pakistani security paradigm. The following chapters 
examine the conflict between civilian leaders and the military and discuss how this 
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discord ultimately led to military control of the nuclear weapons program. The final 
chapter examines the current de jure nuclear command and control structure with the 
Prime Minister as chairman. However, despite the de jure authority of civilian leaders, an 
unstable and unreliable political environment led to the military’s de facto control of the 
arsenal.  
Pakistan was ethnically and politically fragmented from the time of partition from 
India in 1947. In point of fact, “Pakistan” is an amalgamation of the Muslim-dominated 
provinces stitched together. Journalist Christopher Hitchens claims that “Pakistan” is an 
acronym for the provinces: Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, Indus and Sind with “tan” 
derived from Baluchistan.1 If his explanation is correct, the very name “Pakistan” is a 
tangible representation of the ethnic and regional loyalties that perpetuate the country’s 
domestic challenges. As a relatively young nation, these rivalries caused the political 
system to consistently fail to produce legitimate leadership transitions. 
  Historic affiliations created a political system plagued by relentless opposition to 
prime ministers. Internal unrest has been inherent to Pakistani politics and, as a result, the 
military frequently intervenes to restore control. Civilian leaders are often accused of 
corruption and inefficiency, while the military claims to be a guarantor of stability.2 As a 
nuclear-armed state, the effectiveness of the relationship between civilian leaders and 
military officials is vital.  
 While a civilian leader initiated nuclear development, his rule was the only period 
when a democratically elected leader had autonomous control over the program. Zulfiqar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Christopher Hitchens, “Pakistan is the Problem,” Slate, September 15, 2008. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2008/09/pakistan_is_the
2 Ali Abbas Hasanie, Democracy in Pakistan: Crises, Conflicts and Hope for a Change 
(Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2013), 14. 
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Ali Bhutto led the nation from 1971 until he was overthrown in a military coup d'état in 
1977. He justified the creation of a nuclear program after blaming the Pakistani military 
for a defeat at the hands of Indian military power. In 1971, the Indian armed forces dealt 
the Pakistani military a humiliating defeat and separated East Pakistan from West 
Pakistan. After the war, Prime Minister Bhutto shamed the military by reducing its 
budget and intentionally delaying efforts to retrieve prisoners of war from India. He could 
not depend on the military’s conventional strength and sought an alternate security 
solution: a nuclear weapon. 
 In an interview with the Manchester Guardian on March 11, 1965 when he was 
the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Bhutto declared that: 
If India makes an atom bomb, then even if we have to feed on grass and leaves—
or even if we have to starve—we shall also produce an atom bomb as we would 
be left with no other alternative. The answer to an atom bomb can only be an 
atom bomb.3 
 
Subsequently, India built the bomb and Prime Minister Bhutto’s promise was 
fulfilled. After the Indian test of “Smiling Buddha,” the nation’s first detonation of a 
nuclear device on May 18, 1974, Pakistan intensified its efforts to build a nuclear 
weapon. True to Prime Minister Bhutto’s statement, Pakistan overcame many obstacles 
and made great sacrifices to produce a bomb. Unfortunately for the Prime Minister, his 
friction with the military ultimately led to his overthrow and a death sentence from the 
Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Patrick Keatley, “The Brown Bomb,” Guardian (Manchester), March 11, 1965, cited in 
Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 212.	  
4 Muhammad Anwar and Ebad Baig, Pakistan: Time for Change (Bloomington: 
AuthorHouse, 2012), 12. 
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 During President Zia’s term, from 1977 until 1988, he led the military and the 
country. Serving as both the COAS and President allowed Zia to exclude civilian 
involvement from the nuclear program. His rule included the first “cold test” conducted 
by Pakistan in 1983.5 A cold test, or subcritical test, assesses the design of a nuclear 
device, but does not create an atomic explosion.  
While his leadership achieved this level of development, his military leadership 
also created problems for the nuclear program. In a departure from the British-influenced 
style of secular rule, President Zia introduced Sharia law, or Islamic law, to Pakistan.6 
His recruitment of military officers based on their loyalty to Islam led to an Islamization 
of the armed forces. In the context of nuclear management, however, this radicalism is a 
danger to the security of the arsenal.  
After President Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, Pakistan 
returned to democratically elected civilian leadership. The daughter of former Prime 
Minister Zulfiqar Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, was in power from 1988 to 1990 and again 
from 1993 to 1996. During her first term as the Prime Minister, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was 
the President. But despite the new leader, the nuclear command and control system 
established during her predecessor’s term continued. The military maintained its 
authority over nuclear decision-making. President Zia-ul-Haq’s eleven-year tenure had 
allowed the military to manage the arsenal and it was not willing to concede its role to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012), 189. 
6 Swati Parashar, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir,” in Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Implications for 
South Asia, ed. John Wilson and Swati Parashar (Delhi: Pearson Education, 2005), 79.	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new leader. The COAS General Aslam Beg and President G.I. Khan monopolized 
nuclear decision-making and often excluded Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.7  
The military’s refusal to include her in nuclear policy making raised questions 
about the legitimacy of Pakistani nuclear management. The military believed itself the 
most competent institution to make decisions and President G.I. Khan’s years of 
experience with the program gave him unrivaled access to this decision-making. In a 
meeting with American officials during her first term in 1993, Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto was blindsided by U.S. intelligence reports that proved General Beg and President 
G.I. Khan were actively omitting her from nuclear decisions.8 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif led the nation from 1990 to 1993 and from 1996 to 
1998. Notorious for his poor relationship with the military, Prime Minister Sharif 
experienced friction with all five of his Chiefs of Army Staff. He quarreled with General 
Mirza Aslam Beg and General Asif Nawaz and his first term ended when General Abdul 
Waheed dismissed him and President G.I. Khan in 1993 from government.9 Their 
removals resulted in President G.I. Khan officially giving the military control of the 
nuclear arsenal.10 From President Zia establishing military control in between 1977 and 
1993, the military had retained its power over the nuclear program. The military control 
became formal after both civilian leaders, Prime Minister Sharif and President G.I. Khan, 
were dismissed from government in 1993. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Gurmeet Kanwal, “Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India,” Strategic 
Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA 23, no. 10 (2000).	  
8 Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” New Yorker, March 29, 1993, accessed 
February 13, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/03/29/on-the-nuclear-
edge. 
9 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, 324. 
10 Ibid.	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When Prime Minister Sharif returned to power in 1996, he soon faced a new 
threat. In 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests between May 11 and May 13 at its 
Pokhran test site. Prime Minister Sharif responded bluntly: “As a sovereign and 
independent nation, Pakistan will make its own decisions on the steps to be taken towards 
its sovereignty and defense.”11 He initiated these steps in a meeting with the Defense 
Committee Cabinet (DCC). In an interview, he described how Chief of Army Staff 
General Jehangir Karamat was hesitant to respond with a Pakistani test.12 Prime Minister 
Sharif and COAS Karamat ultimately approved the test of Pakistani nuclear devices 
between May 28 and May 30, 1988.  
In 1999, civil-military relations reached a new low when Prime Minister Sharif 
traveled to the U.S. in the midst of the Kargil War to ask for U.S. assistance to diffuse the 
conflict. Instead, U.S. officials presented him with intelligence indicating that the 
Pakistani military, under COAS General Pervez Musharraf, was readying nuclear 
weapons for use against India.13 While COAS Musharraf denies this claim,14 Prime 
Minister Sharif had been so excluded from nuclear decision-making that he could neither 
confirm nor deny the allegations. The U.S. leveraged the resulting discord between Sharif 
and COAS General Musharraf and convinced the Prime Minister that he knew very little 
about the operation of his own military. The U.S. ultimately forced Prime Minister Sharif 
to accept an unconditional withdrawal from the Kargil War, ending the first conflict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “1998: India explodes nuclear controversy,” BBC On This Day 1950-2005, accessed 
January 25, 2015, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/11/newsid_3664000/3664259.stm 
12 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 493. 
13 Nawaz, 133-134. 
14 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 
2006), 98.	  
	   13	  
between India and Pakistan during which both nations possessed an operational 
deterrent.15  
After the Kargil War, both COAS General Musharraf and Prime Minister Sharif 
blamed each other for the Pakistani military’s embarrassing defeat by the Indian armed 
forces. Prime Minister Sharif and his supporters sensed that the military was poised to 
seize control by October 1999. To avoid a military coup d'état, the Prime Minister 
refused to allow General Musharraf’s plane to return to Pakistan from a trip to Sri Lanka. 
Ultimately, airport officials permitted the plane to land and COAS General Musharraf 
overthrew the Sharif government. While Musharraf’s rule from 1999 to 2008 was a 
severe setback to democracy, he oversaw a variety of improvements to the nuclear 
program. 
One of Musharraf’s most notable contributions was the establishment of the 
National Command Authority (NCA) in 2000. The NCA includes both civilian leaders 
and military representatives with the sole purpose of managing the Pakistani nuclear 
weapons program. The Prime Minister is the chairman and oversees two committees, the 
Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee 
(DCC).16 The ECC includes both civilian and military leaders, while the DCC is 
composed of solely military leaders and directors of strategic scientific organizations.17 
While the NCA includes civilian leaders, civilian involvement in nuclear 
decision-making is restricted by the military. The NCA’s secretariat, the Strategic Plans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, 314. 
16 Ibid., 334. 
17 Zafar Aqbal Cheema, “Pakistan,” in Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control and 
Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons, ed. Hans Born, Bates Gill and Heiner 
Hanggi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 206.	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Division (SPD), is the military organization charged with executing NCA policies.18  
Given the military’s familiarity with the program beginning with President Zia’s term, it 
sees itself as the most experienced institution in Pakistan to control the arsenal. The 
military is also responsible for the physical control of weapons and oversees the logistics 
of the program, which furthers its involvement in nuclear decisions.19  
As the former Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA) within 
the SPD, retired Brigadier Feroz Khan explains in an interview with the author, “the 
military is the strongest organization in the country, the most viable organization, the 
most disciplined. And this is their job.”20 As the Director of ACDA, he represented 
Pakistan in a variety of arms control negotiations. After serving in the Pakistani military 
for over thirty years, Brigadier Khan moved to the United States where he held positions 
at research organizations, such as the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Brookings 
Institution. He is currently a lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. He believes that until Pakistan can bring cohesion to its chaotic political 
environment and commit to legitimate civil-military roles, the military is likely to retain 
de facto control of the arsenal.  
Many scholars, including Brigadier Khan, agree that the military is the most 
qualified institution in Pakistan to manage the nuclear arsenal. This paper accepts the 
current de facto command and control system, but analyzes how the military’s de facto 
control developed. While the civilian leadership possesses de jure control, the military’s 
de facto authority was a product of a turbulent and unreliable political environment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, 328-332. 
19 Ibid., 331. 
20 Retired Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan, interview by Emily Werk, Washington D.C., 
January 22, 2015.	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CHAPTER 1- HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1947-1958: AN UNSTABLE 
DEMOCRACY AND A POWERFUL MILITARY 
 The nation of Pakistan became independent fifty years before it exploded its first 
nuclear weapon in May of 1998. On August 14, 1947, the independence of British India 
became official, but it produced two new nations, India and Pakistan, as independence 
was followed immediately with partition. However, in the following months, dividing the 
resources of the British Indian Empire between the two countries proved problematic. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the formative years of Pakistani democracy. It 
will discuss how Pakistan struggled to develop with limited resources and ultimately 
failed to create framework for legitimate democracy.21 The historically strong military 
presence in Pakistan filled the void, but eventually hindered political evolution. 
 A weak Pakistani political infrastructure stemmed from an unequal division of 
resources at the time of partition in 1947. The final Viceroy of India, Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, hurried the division of British Indian so rapidly that partition was complete 
ten months before the original deadline.22 The original plan was for the partition process 
to take an entire year, from June 1947 to June 1948.23 Under Lord Mountbatten’s hasty 
direction, the partition of the subcontinent took just over two months. In the opinion of 
scholar Anas Malik, “the rushed British departure and inadequately transferred and 
apportioned political authority likely contributed to the violence that ensued.”24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Nawaz, 31. 
22 Ibid., 27. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Anas Malik, Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond ideology (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 32.	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 The disproportionate division of resources was a consequence of the hurried 
partition. The unequal division of these resources was mostly due to their location within 
the newly drawn Indian border, and not due to any willful Indian effort to deny resources 
to Pakistan. However, the scarcity of military assets was a challenge to the fledgling 
Pakistani nation. According to Shuja Nawaz, brother of the late Chief of Army Staff 
General Asif Nawaz (COAS from 1991-1993) and former Director of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency: 
Out of the 46 [British Indian Army] training establishments that existed in pre-
partition India, only 7 were in Pakistan…The three command workshops of the 
British Indian army that helped maintain armoured fighting vehicles, radar 
repairs, and crystal cutting, were all left in India, at Secunderabad, Kirkee, and 
Agra. Of the 40 ordnance depots, only 5 small retail depots were located in 
Pakistan.… Similarly, there were twelve engineer stores depots in British India, of 
which only three small depots came to Pakistan. Even the munitions industry that 
was expanded during the Second World War came to reside primarily in India, 
with only 3 of the 18 ordnance factories located in Pakistan. In short, even with 
the greatest willpower and determination of its fighting forces, Pakistan began life 
with a weak logistical infrastructure and serious dependence on Indian goodwill 
to transfer assets to it.25  
 
 The Pakistani military also faced manpower and staffing challenges. For example, 
at partition Pakistan assumed control of 6 of the 14 armored regiments, 8 of the 40 
artillery regiments and half of the infantry regiments and the majority of soldiers that 
comprised the fledgling Pakistani military were from the Punjab province. 26 At the time 
of independence in 1947, Punjabis dominated the ranks of both the military and 
bureaucratic institutions. Of the Army’s posts, Punjabis held 80% of them. Punjabis also 
occupied 55% of bureaucratic and administrative positions.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Nawaz, 31. 
26 Ibid., 32. 
27 Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet Pardesi, “India and Pakistan: The Origins of their 
Different Politico-Military Trajectories.” India Review 9, no. 1 (01, 2010): 48. 
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 The Punjab province was historically crucial to British India. As a recruiting 
ground for the British Army, it became one of the most powerful provinces.28 Such high 
percentages of Punjabis in the British Indian force granted servicemen in the region 
special privileges. The British Indian Army rewarded Punjabi military officers with land 
grants, high salaries, and pensions.29 The British Raj also employed Punjabi rural elites as 
military contractors or liaisons between civilians and the forces.30 Almost every Punjabi 
was involved in some aspect of the military, either directly as a serviceman or indirectly 
as an administrative support official.31 The British recruitment from the Punjab province 
fostered a strong military culture in the region that continued throughout the early years 
of Pakistani maturity. 
The development of civilian government began with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the 
first leader of Pakistan. He held the title of Governor-General from 1947-1948. The 
Governor-General was the Pakistani head of state while under British rule and Pakistan 
continued the position after partition.32 The position existed until 1956 when the nation 
became a republic and replaced it with the role of President.33 Governor-General Jinnah 
was also the director of the Muslim League, a political advocacy group for Pakistani 
independence.34 Unlike India that possessed the enduring political infrastructure of the 
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British Indian Empire, Pakistan established a relatively new political system.35 Governor-
General Jinnah sought to establish a strong central government and encouraged 
democracy.36  
However, political cohesion in Pakistan was evasive. At partition, many Pakistani 
citizens emphasized their loyalty to their province, rather than the nation.37 This 
provinciality was anchored in historical ethnic and regional affiliations that challenged 
Governor-General Jinnah’s ability to unite the nation. On March 21, 1948 he addressed 
Pakistan: 
You belong to a nation now; you have now carved out a territory, vast territory, it 
is all yours; it does not belong to a Punjabi or a Sindhi, or a Pathan, or a Bengali; 
it is yours. You have your central government where several units are represented. 
Therefore, if you want to build yourself into a nation, for God’s sake give up this 
provincialism.38  
 
Governor-General Jinnah sensed that Pakistani instability tempted the military to 
intervene into politics. On June 14, 1948, he clarified the military’s role in a speech to 
officers. He began by reading the oath taken by Pakistani officers pledging their 
allegiance to the constitution. He continued:   
As I have said just now, the spirit is what really matters. I should like you to study 
the Constitution which is in force in Pakistan at present and understand its true 
constitutional and legal implications when you say that you will be faithful to the 
Constitution of the Dominion … the executive authority flows from the Head of 
the Government of Pakistan, who is the Governor-General and, therefore, any 
command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the 
Executive Head.39 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ganguly and Pardesi, 39. 
36 Ibid., 51.	  
37 Ashok Kapur, Pakistan in Crisis (London: Routledge, 2006), 8. 
38 Nawaz, 77. 
39 Ibid., 88.	  
	   19	  
Just a few months later, on September 11, 1948, Governor-General Jinnah passed 
away. According to Kathleen Malley-Morrison, a conflict resolution scholar, “Jinnah was 
perhaps the only leader who could have ensured development of democratic institutions 
in Pakistan.… no other politician emerged with vision, political acumen and resilience 
equaling that of Jinnah’s.”40 Though he never saw the modern, secular Pakistan that he 
envisioned, Governor-General Jinnah attempted to establish the framework for a 
sustainable democracy.  
After Jinnah’s death, Pakistan had a variety of leaders who continued to struggle 
with centralizing government until 1958. Over the span of nine years from 1947-1956, 
Pakistan had four individuals fill the position of Governor-General. The first Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru once commented that the “government in Pakistan 
changes before I change dhoti [pants].”41 While Pakistan struggled to enforce legitimate 
governance, newly independent India developed with significantly more resources and 
infrastructure.42 Much of the Pakistani narrative today faults India for maliciously 
depriving Pakistan of resources. While this may be an exaggeration, Pakistan did face 
resource deficiencies that challenged its development. 
As early as 1951, three years after Governor-General Jinnah’s death, there was 
friction between the Pakistani military and the civilian leadership. Prime Minister Liaquat 
Ali Khan, Governor-General Jinnah’s successor, informed COAS Ayub Khan that 
various military officers had plotted against the Prime Minister in a scheme in early 1951 
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to overthrow his government.43 While Prime Minister Khan focused on prosecuting the 
perpetrators, he neglected other political duties, such as overseeing the creation of a 
Pakistani constitution. According to Nawaz, the years immediately following Governor-
General Jinnah’s death were crucial to establishing the military’s powerful presence. 
Nawaz said, “A weak and dithering central authority gave both the bureaucrats and the 
Pakistan Army a chance to assert their role in shaping policy nationwide.”44 
The Chief of Army Ayub Khan was involved in another civil-military disturbance 
in October of 1958. General Ayub Khan and his forces replaced President Iskander Mirza 
in the country’s first military coup d'état. However, according to the Statesman, a daily 
Pakistani newspaper, both Khan and Mirza orchestrated the incident. In a dispatch 
published on October 11, 1958, the following exchange occurred between COAS Ayub 
Khan, President Mirza, and Statesman reporter Patrick Sergeant. Sergeant describes his 
discussion with the two leaders: 
“There is a two men’s regime. We make policies together and it is my job to carry 
out,” in these words Ayub [Khan] the big, heavy Pakistan’s Army Commander-
in-Chief told me over tea this afternoon how this Commonwealth country will be 
run for at least some time … Said Ayub [Khan] sternly: “The Army has the 
ultimate responsibility; that Army takes that responsibility as if the President does 
not react to a situation” … The President was sitting with us when [Ayub Khan] 
said that their relations seemed cordial.…  
Ayub [Khan] said: “We both came to the conclusion that the country was going to 
the dogs and I said to the President—Are you going to act or are you not. It is 
your responsibility to bring about a change. If you do not which Heaven forbid, 
we shall force a change. The President took the actual decision to make a 
change.” 
The President said: “We have known each other for ages. [Ayub Khan] was the 
only person I talked to. This was a joint decision in which I took the initiative. If 
anybody made the revolution, it was me.”45  
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Many Pakistanis were optimistic that the military could bring stability to the 
politically fragmented nation. On October 10, 1958, Dawn, a well-known English 
language daily newspaper in Pakistan, commented, “now that a break has been made with 
the past system and [a] new one has been ushered in … the peaceful revolution [might 
have been] the answer from heaven.”46 After experiencing four leaders in just ten years, 
Pakistani leadership sought to recentralize its government and allay the political chaos 
that threatened democracy. Chief of Army Staff General Khan became President Khan 
and led the nation until 1969. During this time, he initiated a nuclear energy program and 
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CHAPTER II- THE NUCLEAR DECISION: THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP 
OF GENERAL AYUB KHAN FROM 1958-1971 
 This chapter discusses President Ayub Khan’s refusal to develop nuclear weapons 
for Pakistan. Despite being a military officer, he rejected the ultimate weapon, an atomic 
bomb, for the following reasons: 1) concern over international reaction, 2) worry that 
Pakistani proliferation would cause an arms race, and 3) the belief that Pakistan could 
buy a nuclear weapon if it needed one. During his tenure, relations between President 
Ayub Khan and his civilian subordinates, including Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 
worsened due to disagreements over a nuclear program.  
On October 8, 1958, in his first speech as martial law administrator, President 
Ayub Khan criticized the nation’s politicians for their inefficient and corrupt policies. In 
an address to the nation, he warned, “for the disruptionists, political opportunists, 
smugglers, black marketeers, and other social vermins, sharks and leeches … the soldiers 
and the people are sick of the sight of you.”48 In his book Friends Not Masters, President 
Khan condemned the failed governance of the past. He claimed that the 1956 Pakistani 
Constitution was “an unholy wedlock of the executive, legislative and political functions 
of the state in which the ultimate power for good government remained illusive, 
undefined and, therefore, unoperated [sic].”49 
   
 After years of political chaos, President Khan sought to bring cohesion to 
disparate Pakistani policies. Claiming to be disenchanted with politicians and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Mohammad Ahmed, My Chief Field-Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan (London: 
Longman, Green & Co., 1960), 110-111. 
49 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not masters: A political autobiography (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), 96. 
	   23	  
muddled parliamentary system, President Ayub Khan strengthened the central 
government. He appointed former military colleagues to cabinet positions and 
encouraged them to contribute to the decision-making process.50 He was hesitant to return 
democracy to Pakistan. In a radio talk in October of 1958, he said:  
Let me announce in unequivocal terms that our ultimate aim is to restore 
democracy but of the type that people can understand and work. When the time 
comes your opinion will be freely asked. But when that will be, events alone can 
tell. Meanwhile, we have to put this mess right and put the country on an even 
keel.51 
 
In a speech broadcast over Pakistani radio on September 2, 1959, President Khan 
further discussed the prospect of democracy in Pakistan. He said, “Without going to the 
hard core of our nation, at a really intimate lavel [sic], every system of democracy in our 
country is bound to become a farce, as it did in the past.”52 Despite his promises to return 
Pakistan to democratic rule, he never restored the democratic system.  
President Khan’s rule was also defined by the relationship he built with the 
United States. As Chief of Army Staff (COAS) from 1951-1958, he leveraged Pakistani 
geography in exchange for economic and military assistance from the United States. 
Focused on the Soviet threat, the U.S. was eager to establish forward bases in Pakistan in 
exchange for American weapons and financial aid. 53  Just a few years after the 1947 
partition, Pakistan was scrambling to match Indian military power. When General Khan 
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met with American leaders in 1954, he emphasized the Pakistani need for military 
assistance to counteract the growing Indian conventional superiority.54 
General Khan also persuaded the Americans that military aid to Pakistan could 
halt the Soviet advance into the region. He convinced U.S. officials that increased 
military assistance could prevent the Soviets invading Pakistan and snatching a “ripe but 
undamaged plum into the Soviet paw.”55 American Vice President Richard Nixon spoke 
highly of the mutually beneficial relationship when he said that, “Pakistan is a country I 
would do anything for.”56 Bruce Riedel, a former White House advisor on South Asia, 
called the alliance “a long Nixon romance with Pakistan”57 and dubbed Pakistan 
America’s “most allied ally.”58 
 Pakistani relations with the U.S., however, weakened during Khan’s rule as 
president in the late 1950s and 1960s. They reached a new low when the Soviet Union 
shot down an American U-2 spy plane on May 1, 1960. Shortly after the incident, the 
Soviets cautioned Pakistan against allowing the U.S to conduct clandestine operations 
from its bases. In an attempt to deny involvement, Army Chief Khalid Mahmud Arif 
stated that, “Pakistan felt deceived because the U.S. had kept her in the dark about such 
clandestine spy operations launched from Pakistani territory.”59  
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According to Christine Fair, a South Asian political and military affairs expert, 
the U-2 incident was also a warning to the Pakistanis that its alliance with the U.S. could 
be hazardous: 
[The U-2] episode, perhaps more than any other preceding it, demonstrated to the 
Pakistanis that the alliance with the United States might entail significant risks. 
Ayub began to distance himself from the United States, realizing that Pakistan 
might have cultivated an unhealthy reliance on an unreliable partner.60  
 
With a deteriorating relationship with the Americans, Pakistan was suddenly more 
vulnerable to Indian aggression. Some of General Khan’s cabinet members encouraged 
him to pursue alternative security solutions. Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was 
one of those advisors. Over the course of his term as Foreign Minister, Bhutto relentlessly 
advocated for a nuclear weapons program because he believed an atomic bomb was the 
ultimate guarantor of Pakistani survivability. Bhutto advocated that the nation could 
negate India’s conventional superiority by possessing a nuclear deterrent.61  
Foreign Minister Bhutto persistently tried to convince President Ayub Khan that 
nuclear weapons were critical for Pakistani survival.62 He steadfastly believed that 
Pakistani vulnerability required the security provided by a nuclear weapon. He 
encouraged individuals within the Foreign Ministry, such as Agha Shahi, to convince the 
President of the value of an atom bomb. On one occasion, Shahi spoke with one of 
President Ayub Khan’s golf partners, Defense Secretary Nasir Rana. Shahi requested that 
Nasir emphasize the urgency of proliferation by pleading, “We are moving into the 
nuclear age. India is going to develop nuclear weapons and it is happening.” In response, 
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President Ayub Khan responded with frustration, “Why is the Foreign Office so jittery? 
What will India do with nuclear weapons? How will they deliver the nuclear system?”63 
 Members of his cabinet mirrored President Khan’s skepticism. Foreign Minister 
Manzur Qadir and Army Chief General Musa Khan were among those on his staff who 
preferred to avoid proliferation.64 Some cabinet members were not against the security 
benefits of a nuclear deterrent, but emphasized the challenges proliferation would present 
to their respective organizations. According to Brigadier Khan, they “all saw national 
interest through the lens of their own organizational interests. Most notable in their 
caution were the country’s finance and economic managers.”65 In the case of Finance 
Minister Mohammad Shoaib, the concern was the exorbitant cost of maintaining a 
weapons program.66 
President Khan had observed how the nuclear programs of the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union had drained them of resources that could be better devoted to helping developing 
nations.  He criticized the two superpowers’ extravagant spending on their nuclear 
programs and claimed that the arms race between the nations compromised the well-
being of the entire world. In his diary, Khan wrote that “another ruinous nuclear 
armament race is in sight between America and Russia. … This would be a terrible waste 
as this expenditure, or portion of it, spent on the needy world could change the history of 
mankind … wasteful and purposeless.”67 
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President Khan also understood the dangers of widespread proliferation in nations 
less prepared to handle the responsibility of a nuclear program. Skeptical that India could 
establish an operational nuclear arsenal, he believed Pakistan did not need nuclear 
weapons. Countries like the U.S. and the USSR were world superpowers, equipped with 
the resources, expertise, and manpower to effectively manage their arsenals. In Khan’s 
opinion, Pakistan lacked experience with strategic competition and decision-making. 
Unable to predict what would transpire over the following decades, he worried about a 
hazardous world where “even smaller countries might have [nuclear weapons]. In that 
case the world will be a very, very dangerous place to live in … because nuclear weapons 
and territorial nationalism are incompatible and [a] deadly danger to the survival of the 
human race.”68 
Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Bhutto, worried that Pakistan was 
wasting valuable time. Even before there was definitive evidence that India was building 
an atom bomb, Bhutto warned the President that Pakistan needed one of its own.69 He 
believed a nuclear deterrent would provide the necessary security for a nation facing a 
variety of challenges; most notably, he worried about Indian aggression. Brigadier Feroz 
Khan cited three specific issues that confronted Bhutto when he assumed the role of 
Foreign Minister in the early 1960s: negotiations with the U.S. and United Kingdom, 
negotiations with China on the disputed border areas, negotiations with India over the 
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mountainous, demarcated area of Kashmir.70 Both India and Pakistan claim the land and 
it has been a source of conflict since partition.  
The diplomatic challenges on Bhutto’s agenda were a tangible representation of 
the vulnerable security environment. The nation faced border disagreements with two 
neighbors and they believed the U.S. was becoming an unreliable ally. When Pakistan 
badly lost the 1965 war with India, Pakistani security concerns became a reality. Pakistan 
was unable to leverage its relationship with the U.S. to counter Indian aggression when 
the United States halted aid to both India and Pakistan as a result of the conflict.71 
Without American military assistance, Pakistan rushed to address India’s military 
superiority in manpower, weaponry, and readiness.  
There was also Pakistani concern that India had initiated a nuclear weapons 
program. Munir Ahmed Khan, a technical advisor for the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission (PAEC) since the early 1950s, claimed that the Indian nuclear program was 
rapidly progressing.72 As a nuclear scientist himself, Munir Khan may have desired a 
similar program in Pakistan. In October of 1965, Bhutto and Munir Ahmed Khan met in 
Vienna, Austria and Bhutto urged Munir to explain the success of the Indian program to 
President Ayub Khan.73 Foreign Minister Bhutto encouraged Munir to meet with 
President Ayub Khan a few months later to explain the necessity of a Pakistani weapons 
program.  
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President Ayub Khan and Munir met on December 11, 1965 at the Dorchester 
Hotel in London.74 Munir explained that he had travelled to the Bhabha Atomic Research 
Center outside of Trombay in 1964 and witnessed India’s CIRUS research reactor.75 
Munir Khan recalls that: 
I told him that there were no restrictions on nuclear technology, it was freely 
available, India was soaking it up, so was Israel. The cost estimates at that time, 
because things were less expensive, were not more than 150 million dollars. I 
must say Ayub Khan listened to me very patiently, but at the end he said that 
Pakistan is too poor to spend that much money. Moreover, if we need the bomb, 
we will buy it off the shelf. Subsequent attempts to persuade him … failed 
completely. We lost several long years and many windows of opportunity.76  
 
Despite President Ayub Khan’s aversion to nuclear weapons, Bhutto soon 
declared the Pakistani intent to pursue the atomic bomb. In a 1965 interview with a 
British newspaper, the Manchester Guardian, he boldly stated that “if India makes an 
atom bomb, then even if we have to feed on grass and leaves—or even if we have to 
starve—we shall also produce an atom bomb as we would be left with no other 
alternative. The answer to an atom bomb can only be an atom bomb.”77 It is possible that 
India’s conventional superiority following the 1965 war and new suspicions of a nuclear 
weapons program fueled his statement. His declaration could also be a warning to India 
that Pakistan was willing to match its rival in development of the technology. 
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After the disastrous 1965 war with India, President Ayub Khan’s domestic 
popularity was at an all-time low. Meanwhile, Bhutto had grown in popularity since the 
early 1960s for two main reasons: his fiery desire to express Third World complaints; and 
his portrayal of India’s reluctance to negotiate on Kashmir as an immature and petty 
position. As a spokesperson for the Pakistani people on these issues, the former Foreign 
Minister was able to harness the frustrations of the citizens and position himself to take 
control.78  
The Tashkent Agreement in January of 1966 was the beginning of President Ayub 
Khan’s downfall. This agreement required that Pakistan abandon strategic passages in 
disputed territories between India and Pakistan. While many international observers 
agreed that a treaty was inevitable, the agreement was wildly unpopular in Pakistan.79 
Bhutto opportunistically distanced himself further from his former boss. According to 
Jyotindra Nath Dixit, former Indian Foreign Secretary: 
Bhutto disowned its results immediately after returning from Tashkent, calling it a 
“surrender and a betrayal” of Pakistani interests.… Bhutto was a prime mover in 
this enterprise and in disowning the Tashkent Agreement. He had strongly 
opposed the signing of the Declaration and Ayub Khan had overruled him. Now 
he fully utilized the groundswell of public criticism to question the motivation and 
performance of Ayub.80  
 
Frustrated with Bhutto’s defiance, the President requested that Bhutto depart 
Pakistan for a leave of absence due to “health concerns.”81 In reality, Bhutto had 
exhausted Khan’s patience. His audacious personality clashed with his role as Foreign 
Minister. Rather than cooperating in an advisory capacity, Bhutto relentlessly challenged 
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his decisions and did so publicly. At President Khan’s encouraging, Bhutto departed from 
Pakistani government.  
As President Khan’s popularity and health declined during the late 1960s, Bhutto 
formed a political party of his own. In 1966, Bhutto finished a socialist manifesto 
outlining founding principles of a new political party: “Islam is our faith, democracy is 
our policy, socialism is our economy, all power to the people.”82 The following year in 
1967, he founded the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). According to Ali Abbas Hasanie, a 
columnist for The Lahore Times, Bhutto sought revenge against President Khan for his 
leadership failures.83 
Bhutto’s campaign motto emphasized transforming Pakistani politics to refocus 
on the nation’s citizens. The first pillar of his campaign was a new socialist economic 
structure. Bhutto appealed to the Pakistani youth and working class people who were 
enamored with socialist ideals. Many citizens were frustrated with the wealth of President 
Khan and his family while the rest of the country suffered. In the words of Air Marshal 
Asghar Khan:  
He has not curbed the members of his family sufficiently and he has permitted 
them to amass wealth.… The point is that the bureaucracy in a country like ours 
controls who gets rich through its licensing authority. Ayub’s attitude has been 
that of a benign, sympathetic family man who tells you how clever his boys are. 
He has shut an eye to everything. We are a poor country, you know, and people 
simply cannot stomach this in the midst of so much poverty and misery.84  
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Next, Bhutto harnessed the insecurity and anger among Pakistani citizens after the 
1965 war with India. He claimed that President Ayub Khan’s policies were weak and had 
failed to address Pakistani security concerns. Bhutto was unapologetically harsh in his 
criticism of his former boss. He characterized President Khan as an inefficient leader that 
left Pakistan defenseless against Indian aggression.85  
Bhutto’s opportunity to take power came in 1969 when President Ayub Khan’s 
military administration disintegrated. Bhutto’s popular revolution garnered widespread 
support among the masses. He convinced many Pakistani citizens that Khan did not have 
Pakistani interests in mind. Shortly after Khan’s government fell in March 1969, General 
Yahya Khan became the nation’s martial law administrator. With the military’s support, 
he reorganized the Pakistani electoral system to ensure fair elections.  He established a 
system where each individual cast a ballot and the popular vote determined the nation’s 
leader. According to Brigadier Khan, “to date [in 2012], the 1970 elections are reputed to 
have been the most free and fair elections in the nation’s history.”86 
However, Zulfiqar Bhutto’s PPP did not win the elections. Ironically, the Awami 
League, based in East Pakistan, won the popular vote. Of the 56,941,500 registered voters 
in Pakistan, over thirty million of them hailed from East Pakistan. While the Awami 
League only won 39.2% of the popular vote, it was enough to bring the presidency to 
East Pakistan. The PPP only claimed 18.6% of the vote, but leaders in West Pakistan 
were unwilling to concede power to the Awami League.87 
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The martial law administrator, President Yahya Khan, refused to pass the 
presidency to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League. Tensions grew as a 
military operation named Operation Searchlight targeted East Pakistani students and 
protestors for causing unrest. According to Sumit Ganguly, a scholar of India and the 
subcontinent: 
Focused on the Bengali population of Dacca and its environs, [Operation 
Searchlight’s] purpose was to decimate the likely sources of political opposition 
to the military regime in West Pakistan. The brutality and scale of this military 
operation against a civilian population was unparalleled in the history of South 
Asia. For example, the army killed substantial members of defenceless students 
on the campus of Dacca University, which was perceived to be a hotbed of 
resistance to the military regime.88 
 
In response to Operation Searchlight and years of oppression from West Pakistan, 
East Pakistan declared independence and a war between the two regions broke out on 
March 26, 1971. After India entered the conflict on December 3, 1971, to support East 
Pakistan, the Pakistani armed forces surrendered in East Pakistan on December 16, 1971. 
India’s superior conventional forces had forced a dramatic disintegration of the West 
Pakistani military capability. After the war, East Pakistan declared independence to 
become Bangladesh and, in Pakistan, President Yahya passed power to Zulfiqar Bhutto 
on December 20, 1971.  
On the night of December 20, 1971, Prime Minister Bhutto promised to represent 
the interests of the people in an address to the nation: 
I make a solemn pledge that I will serve you with all my heart and will, I will 
serve even if it kills me. I know what the people of Pakistan want.… I am simply 
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nobody. I cannot be carried on a gun or a bayonet. I can only be carried in your 
heart. I will never deceive you. I will never betray you.89 
  
 Without the nuclear restraint demonstrated by President Ayub Khan, Bhutto 
prioritized initiating a nuclear weapons program. The next portion of this paper discusses 
his motivations for desiring an atomic bomb and how he rallied the scientific community 
behind him. It will also discuss his poor relationship with the military and how he 
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CHAPTER III- THE NUCLEAR DECISION: CIVILIAN AUTONOMY OVER 
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM FROM 1971-1977 
In contrast to later coup d’états when the military seized power from civilian 
leaders, Bhutto’s civilian government took power from President Ayub Khan’s military 
leadership. In the wake of the devastating results of the 1971 war with India, Bhutto 
sought to punish the military for its defeat. Though the army was already financially 
depleted and substantially weakened in manpower, Bhutto cut the defense budget even 
further and reduced the percent of external aid from other nations going to the military.90 
Over 90,000 prisoners of war remained in India after the Pakistani surrender and Bhutto 
purposefully delayed negotiating their release.91 He further shamed the military by 
reorganizing their ranks and appointing Lieutenant-General Gul Hassan Khan, a close 
friend, as the next Chief of Army Staff.92 
His poor relationship with the military was likely why he excluded them in early 
decisions about the nuclear program. This chapter examines Bhutto’s unrelentless pursuit 
of an atomic bomb and how he recruited help from the scientific community. Until the 
1974 Indian nuclear test, he wholly omitted the military from the project. After the test, 
the military’s technical expertise is necessary. First, this chapter addresses Bhutto’s 
primary concern, India, and why the nation was a contributing factor, if not the deciding 
factor, in initiating a nuclear weapons program. 
According to S. Paul Kapur, a South Asian and nuclear proliferation scholar, the 
1971 war changed the dynamic between India and Pakistan: 
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The 1971 Bangladesh War greatly strengthened India’s conventional military 
position relative to Pakistan. India had always enjoyed conventional military superiority 
on the subcontinent. However, while it was significant, Indian military superiority had 
not been perceived as overwhelming.… In the wake of such a catastrophic Pakistani 
defeat, India’s military superiority was plain for all to see, and Pakistani leaders could no 
longer rest assured that war with India would at worst result in a stalemate. Rather, it was 
now clear that fighting a war with India could put Pakistan in mortal peril.93 
 
Embarrassed by the military’s humiliating defeat in the 1971 war, Bhutto was 
determined to find alternate security solutions for Pakistani vulnerability. Less than a 
month after taking control, Bhutto scheduled a meeting in Multan to gather scientists 
from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Association (PAEC). Prior to the meeting, a collection 
of scientists sent a telegram to newly elected Prime Minister Bhutto. According to Sultan 
Bashiruddin Mahmood an expert on civilian nuclear power at Karachi Nuclear Power 
Plant (KANUPP), the Association of Nuclear Engineers for a Nuclear Pakistan contacted 
the Prime Minister encouraging him to pursue nuclear weapons. Mahmood said that, “we 
were the bomb lobby. So I sent a telegram to Bhutto, saying that I represent the engineers 
of the Atomic Energy Commission at [the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and 
Technology (PINSTECH)], and we should be given a chance to speak [at the meeting in 
Multan].”94 
On January 24, 1972, Bhutto met with the nation’s top fifty scientists in Multan. 
He held the meeting at the personal residence of Nawab Sadiq, a PPP supporter.95 While 
the country’s nuclear program began in the 1950s with research programs, its nuclear 
weapons program did not begin until this meeting. Bhutto began the meeting by 
reaffirming his support for the Pakistani nuclear scientists and then made an 
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announcement about leadership changes at PAEC. He declared his decision to name his 
own appointee to the PAEC chair, removing the current chairman, Ishrat Hussain 
Usmani, from the position.96 
Usmani was likely removed as PAEC Chairman because he requested patience 
and prudence from Bhutto on the topic of acquiring an atomic bomb. He was cautious 
and judicious in his analysis of proliferation. He foresaw a ripple effect; if some nations 
developed nuclear weapons programs, every country would want to do so.97 However, 
Usmani doubted the Pakistani ability to embark on such a program. He said in an 
interview that, “Bhutto had asked me to take our nuclear program to its logical 
conclusion. But I refused. Pakistan just didn’t have the infrastructure for that kind of 
nuclear program. I’m not talking about the ability to get ten kilograms of plutonium. I’m 
talking about the real infrastructure.”98 Bhutto replaced him with a close friend and less 
hesitant leader, Munir Ahmed Khan.99  
At this meeting, Mahmood also approached Bhutto about initiating a Pakistani 
nuclear program. He challenged Bhutto to transform the Pakistani desire for regional 
security into a tangible product: a bomb. He stood up in the meeting and said: 
So far the people who have come, they have said that you are a very great man. 
But nobody has talked about what we should do. Perhaps the conductor of the bus 
who takes us to PINSTECH knows better than them. When the bus stops there, 
the bus conducter [sic] shouts, ‘Nilore bomb factory, Nilore bomb factory.’ This 
is the public impression of what is happening in that building, but we know that 
there is no program like that and what Pakistan needs today is to make a bomb.100  
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Later in the meeting, Bhutto spoke about acquiring a nuclear bomb. According to 
his press secretary, Khalid Hasan, “[Prime Minister Bhutto] had great charisma and he 
really moved those people. They cheered him and they said they could do it. Everyone 
believed him [him].”101 Prime Minister Bhutto noted that “[Pakistan] is fighting a 
thousand year war with India and we will make an atomic bomb even if we have to eat 
grass. So in how many years can you get it?”102 PAEC scientists gave an optimistic 
estimate of 3-5 years. 
Mahmood, a nuclear scientist at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), 
described the enthusiasm at the meeting: 
There was excitement; with some saying five years, some seven, some said ten. 
People were raising their hands. Someone was jumping. There was shouting, like 
in a fish market. Bhutto said, ‘OK, OK, five years.’ Then someone shouted three 
years.103 
 
 While it would take scientists far longer than these estimates, Bhutto had instilled 
an interest for nuclear weapons within the scientific community. Reflecting on his 
involvement in the early years of the program, Bhutto said, “When I took charge of 
Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission, it was no more than a sign board of an office. It 
was only a name. Assiduously and with granite determination, I put my entire vitality 
behind the task of acquiring nuclear capability for my country.”104 The PAEC became the 
sole Pakistani institution to pursue nuclear weapons. Perhaps still bitter over the 1971 
war, Bhutto did not include the military in planning the weapons program.  
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 Bhutto justified the creation of a nuclear weapons program with three reasons: 
national humiliation, superior Indian forces, and the unreliability of allies. First, the war 
of 1971 instilled a deep sentiment of insecurity and humiliation at the hands of its enemy. 
He sympathized with the nationwide embarrassment from losing the 1971 war with India. 
In the elections of 1970, Bhutto’s people’s revolution promised to represent the interests 
of the people, particularly minorities and the working class. Pakistani infrastructure was 
clearly insecure considering the ease with which India overran the Pakistani armed 
forces. Citizens were shocked and anxious; Pakistan had been split into two countries and 
its biggest rival had handily defeated the Pakistani Army.  
Second, Bhutto cited India’s superior forces. The Pakistani military’s 
conventional capabilities were entirely insufficient for defeating India and this was made 
apparent explicitly during the 1971 war.105 Just four days after India entered the war, 
Pakistan surrendered. Bhutto knew that India was superior militarily, and worried that 
Pakistan would never be able to catch up if India developed an atomic bomb. He was 
unwavering in his opinion. Pakistan was comparatively weak and would only become 
more vulnerable as India advanced both its conventional and nuclear capabilities.106  
Bhutto’s third and final motive in pursuing a nuclear program was the 
unreliability of its alliance with the U.S.107 Despite a flow of arms and aid into Pakistan in 
the years leading up to both the 1965 and 1971 wars, Pakistan realized that its alliance 
with the U.S. had many limitations. The U.S. needed Pakistan as a forward base during 
the Cold War and wanted a South Asian ally to stand up against Soviet aggression. 
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However, the U.S. was unwilling to get entangled in conflict with India on behalf of 
Pakistan.  
Scholars such as Husain Haqqani refer to the country’s status as a “rentier” state, 
a nation that generates revenue due to its coveted geography.108 According to one former 
official under George W. Bush, the Pakistanis felt like the Americans “used them like a 
Dixie cup and then threw them away.”109 The Americans were unwilling to participate in 
what they viewed as petty border disagreements between India and Pakistan. Rather than 
depending on the U.S. for aid and military assistance, Pakistan was ready to establish its 
own national security; never again would India exploit its weak defenses.  
Just two months after the conference in Multan, newly-appointed PAEC 
Chairman Munir Khan met again with Bhutto.110 Without resistance from Usmani, 
civilian leader Bhutto was ready to proceed with a nuclear program. Their plan allowed 
for development in nuclear power, as well as the nuclear weapons program. Munir Khan 
described the plan as “[envisaging] complete control of the nuclear fuel cycle, and 
building numerous plants and facilities for the generation and application of nuclear 
know-how.”111 The PAEC would oversee the construction of new facilities to support the 
new capabilities. They decided that Pakistan would pursue both uranium and plutonium 
enrichment.112 
Bhutto and Munir Khan also agreed that the PAEC must bring Pakistani scientists 
working outside of the country back to Pakistan. Over the next couple of decades, there 
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was an increased emphasis on limiting reliance on outside assistance. Pakistan needed to 
develop their nuclear program using Pakistani technology with the guidance of Pakistani 
scientists; depending on foreign assistance was a risk that the nation was not willing to 
take. After the 1971 war, the nation had felt abandoned by the U.S. and had decided to 
never again depend on outside help.113 
Bhutto intensified the efforts of the nuclear program after the surprise Indian test 
of an atomic bomb in 1974. India detonated a ten-kiloton nuclear device on May 18, 1974 
just a few minutes past 8:00 am.114 Probably intended to threaten the Pakistanis, the 
Indian test took place less than 50 miles from the India-Pakistan border in the Rajasthan 
desert.115 Bhutto went before the nation to give an address following the tests. He had 
long understood the implications of a nuclear India, but urged Pakistani citizens to not be 
alarmed. 
Let me make it clear that we are determined not to be intimidated by the threat. I 
give a solemn pledge to all my countrymen that we will never let Pakistan be a 
victim of nuclear blackmail … nor will we accept Indian hegemony or domination 
over the subcontinent.116  
 
While Bhutto had long considered the consequences of an Indian nuclear 
capability, the Pakistani military was caught entirely off-guard. According to an 
assessment by the former Director of Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Brigadier 
Khan, “until [the test], it had been seemingly oblivious to the implications of the nuclear 
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ambitions in the neighborhood and ignorant of the development in India.”117 At this time, 
the civilian leader was more knowledgeable of nuclear proliferation and nuclear threats 
than the military, which was completely unaware of the security dilemma brewing in its 
backyard. 
Seven years earlier, in 1967, when the PAEC was still chaired by Usmani, he had 
traveled to the Pakistani Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ). He talked about highly 
enriched uranium and plutonium in a presentation titled “The Mysteries of the Atom.” 
Reflecting on the event, retired Lieutenant-General Syed Refaqat stated that “nobody 
understood the earlier part of his presentation—that had lots of charts, graphs, tubes, 
atoms and fuel flowing this way and that way—but then he paused and said, “Gentlemen, 
once you have achieved this you can also make a bomb.” After that statement, Refaqat 
recalled that Usmani received a standing ovation.118 Usmani’s presentation was the first 
exposure that many officers had to nuclear technology, but the military continued to 
remain uninvolved with Pakistani efforts until the Indian test.  
It is likely the military was too occupied with other issues to prepare for the 
possibility that India would develop nuclear weapons capability. The military was still 
adapting to changes made by Bhutto when he came into power in 1971. Many of the 
90,000 POWs of the 1971 war were still in Indian captivity due to Bhutto’s intentional 
neglect. Military leaders were busy reorganizing the officer ranks and the structure of the 
military’s remaining manpower. Bhutto had also significantly cut the defense budget as 
punishment, meant to shame the military after its embarrassing defeat. Still adjusting to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, 119.	  
118 Ibid., 80. 
	   43	  
changes in manpower, structure, and budget, the military was wholly unprepared for the 
reality of a nuclear India.119 
 In an interview, Lieutenant-General Syed Refaqat portrayed the military as 
vulnerable and uninformed regarding the nuclear threat. He said: 
At that time the military thinking was purely in military-operation terms. We all 
thought in terms of primitive military ideas such as what would become of the 
Pakistan bridgehead were we to launch a tactical riposte against India. The army 
was so extremely simplistic, almost innocent, about the implications of a nuclear 
bomb. This showed we had no doctrine—we had not studied this subject in all 
seriousness, even though the army had an idea that a nuclear program was on its 
way. It would take some time for the army to become aware of the use of nuclear 
technology.120 
 
In short, the Pakistani Army’s inexperience with nuclear technology had limited 
its involvement with the program until the 1974 test. There was no organization within 
the military dedicated to nuclear issues. After the Indian test, military officials were 
included in the pursuit of an atom bomb, though Bhutto retained authority over the 
direction of the nuclear program.  
 Less than a month after the Indian test, Prime Minister Bhutto organized his 
cabinet advisors, members of the scientific community, and three military officers in a 
Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) meeting. Civilians in attendance were the 
Foreign Minister, Foreign Secretary, Finance Secretary, Information Minister and PPP 
Secretary General. From the military, Bhutto included Secretary of Defense Major-
General Fazal-e-Muqeem Khan and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the Chief of Naval 
Staff (CNS) and the Chief of Air Staff (CAS).121 While Bhutto had stated his intent to 
initiate a nuclear weapons program in Multan in 1971, the DCC meeting on June 15, 
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1974 was the first official meeting between nuclear decision-makers. The meeting 
concluded with a declaration that an atomic bomb was undeniably necessary.122 
With intensified resolve to produce a nuclear weapon, Bhutto reached out to a 
scientist employed abroad, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Dr. A.Q. Khan was working for a 
Dutch contracting company that provided services to the Urenco group. Specifically, he 
studied uranium metallurgy and how to produce uranium for power reactors.123 He 
applied his knowledge to improve the efficiency of a gas centrifuge method called the 
Zippe-type uranium centrifuge while at Urenco. He later began stealing the top-secret 
blueprints to share with Pakistani scientists.124 The expertise that A.Q. Khan gained while 
in the Netherlands became invaluable when he returned to Pakistan and began to work 
towards a nuclear weapon.  
Responsible for both the decision to pursue nuclear weapons and for bringing 
home one of the era’s most influential nuclear scientists, Bhutto’s civilian government 
initiated a dedicated nuclear weapons program. The military remained somewhat 
detached from the program, which remained primarily a project of the scientific 
community. Bhutto took a personal interest in the program, regularly meeting with his 
close friend and PAEC director Munir Khan. Bhutto was unwavering in his commitment 
to restore Pakistani security and negate the growing conventional gap with India through 
nuclear weapons. 
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In 1974, Bhutto oversaw the creation of the Directorate of Technical 
Development (DTD) within the PAEC.125 Christened “perhaps the best kept secret of 
Pakistan’s nuclear program,” the DTD “controlled and handled all aspects of the design, 
fabrication, manufacturing and testing of the atomic bomb.”126 Seven crucial 
organizations worked under the Directorate of Technical Development. These included 
the Wah Group, the Theoretical Group, the Fast Neutron Physics Group, Diagnostics 
Group, High Explosive/HMX Group, High-Speed Electronics Group and the High-
Precision Mechanical Group. Each of these groups focused on a different element of 
bomb design and construction.127 
In 1976, A.Q. Khan divorced his organization, the Engineering Research Labs 
(ERL), from PAEC.128 This removed ERL from the oversight of PAEC and Munir Khan. 
In May of 1981, the labs were renamed the Khan Research Labs (KRL) in honor of A.Q. 
Khan.129 A.Q. Khan and his colleagues at KRL focused on the enrichment of uranium, 
whereas PAEC pursued the plutonium route.130 In 1975, A.Q. Khan began stealing 
blueprints of gas centrifuges and continued to exploit his relationship with individuals at 
Urenco in the coming years.131  
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A.Q. Khan was obsessed with measuring the progress of his labs against that of 
the PAEC. The competition later developed into an outright rivalry between the two 
scientific organizations. The nuclear program originally benefited from the competition 
because the rivalry produced quicker timelines and intensified effort between the labs. 
However, it eventually hindered the nuclear program because the organizations 
compartmentalized information. As Maliha Lodhi, former Pakistani Ambassador to the 
United States, explains, “[though] endemic professional jealousy slowed the nuclear 
endeavor, it also spurred innovation that produced eventual success.”132 
 While Munir Khan and A.Q. Khan developed the nuclear program, Prime 
Minister Bhutto faced domestic unrest and defiance from the military. Bhutto continued 
to make demands that were resisted by leaders of the military. Bhutto responded by 
removing certain officers from their positions. Bhutto was also alienating members of his 
own party, the PPP, over a variety of disagreements.  
Prime Minister Bhutto’s conflict with the military began less than a year after he 
took power in 1971 and worsened until the 1977 elections. The civil-military friction first 
surfaced when Bhutto forced the resignations of Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant-General 
Gul Hassan Khan and Chief of the Air Force Rahim Khan.133 Both COAS Hassan Khan 
and CAS Rahim Khan were uncomfortable when Bhutto’s demands required illegal 
action by the military. Many military officers believed such requests were unreasonable 
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for a professional military and the two men refused. In one instance, for example, Bhutto 
asked the military to repress a police rebellion in the Peshawar province.134  
On another occasion, Prime Minister Bhutto requested assistance from COA 
Khan. When Rahim Khan refused, Prime Minister Bhutto arranged a meeting between 
himself, the COA and the COAS. Recalling the meeting, COAS Hassan Khan stated: 
Bhutto began. “We have been through one crisis after another, the last one being 
the police strike. Both the Army and the Air Force refused to help the 
Government. I feel the stage has come where we cannot carry on any longer. 
There is no cooperation from the Army and the PAF and I am not prepared to run 
the Government in this environment.” He then turned to the Air Chief for an 
answer. “I was asked to arrange to fly dummy runs by fighter planes over 
Faisalabad and I refused, because this is not the role of the PAF,” said Rahim 
Kham. Bhutto was in no mood to enter into dialogue with the Air Chief, so he 
nodded in my direction. I said, “I am afraid non-cooperation from the Army will 
continue if the demands placed upon it are not lawful. As far as I am concerned I 
am fed up and if anyone can give me a piece of paper and a pencil, I am prepared 
to quit right now.”135 
 
 Prime Minister Bhutto felt differently. He believed it was within his authority to 
direct the military as necessary. According to Pakistani-American scholar Hassan Abbas: 
Bhutto suggested that he be invited to sit in during proceedings of the army 
promotion boards. By virtue of being chief executive, it was within his right and 
discretion to do so, but this was turned down by the general. [Shortly after], at one 
stroke, Bhutto lost quite a bit of support within the army. General Gul Hassan 
believed that the government’s campaign to denigrate the army was affecting its 
morale. On the other hand, Bhutto apparently was convinced that the army 
deserved this treatment.136 
 
Since COAS Gul Hassan and CAS Rahim Khan refused to use the military to 
support Bhutto’s civilian government internally, he created his own personal paramilitary 
group called the Federal Security Force (FSF). By the mid 1970s, the FSF had over 
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14,000 personnel.137 The purpose of the FSF was to ensure that the military did not 
become too powerful and ignore civilian demands. Bhutto’s creation of the FSF indicated 
his frustration with the professional military that refused to illegally aid his civilian 
government.138 The FSF was also a tangible demonstration of his concern that the military 
would stage a coup d'état.   
 In what Brigadier Khan calls an “arrogance of power,” Bhutto used the FSF to 
expel founding members of the PPP from the country and this alienated members of the 
scientific community.139 A longtime acquaintance of Bhutto, J.A. Rahim, was one of the 
individuals beaten and exiled by the FSF.140 Bhutto’s disparagement of former PPP allies 
and members of the scientific community demonstrated his political conceit. The creation 
of the FSF reflected Bhutto’s desire to use the professional military as his personal pawn, 
a status that was opposed by COAS Gul Hassan and CAS Rahin Khan. 
By 1976, the FSF had grown to over 18,000 personnel from 14,000 in 1974.141 
While the Pakistani military was suspicious that the Prime Minister was increasing the 
numbers in his paramilitary force, Bhutto’s generous defense expenditure hushed 
complaints.142 To replace COAS Gul Hassan, Prime Minister Bhutto chose General 
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Bhutto also appointed General Muhammad Sharif to be the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJSC), though it was known that the 
two men were rivals. The appointments bypassed higher-ranking officials, which angered 
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individuals in the military. His decision to appoint two rival leaders was intended to 
prevent military collusion against the civilian government. Brigadier Khan observed in 
his book that: 
There is only one plausible explanation for Zia’s promotion—to exploit the 
cleavage between the two senior commanders. Bhutto made a Machiavellian 
move to keep the two men focused on each other and thus keep the military away 
from the domain of civilian power.143 
 
 A year later, Bhutto ran for reelection. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had 
formed a multi-party coalition to protest Bhutto’s government.144 Amid allegations that he 
rigged elections, unrest within the Pakistani populace and the military grew. According to 
a Pakistani government report produced post-election: 
The newspapers were further advised to publish the latest official portrait of the 
Prime Minister in the centre of their front pages in 3 columns x 8 in[ches] size, 
with the caption: ‘The Supreme Leader; The Undisputed Leader, the Great 
Leader.’145 
 
While the PPP won a majority in the National Assembly, the PNA protested the 
corrupt elections.146 The political situation became so toxic that Chief of Army Staff Zia-
ul-Haq officially declared a military takeover on July 5, 1977.147 In the weeks following 
the military coup, President Zia-ul-Haq promised the Pakistani public that he would hold 
elections within the next 90 days, but that did not happen.148 On September 1, 1977, 
President Zia-ul-Haq recanted his previous guarantee of democratic elections. In a press 
conference, he declared: 
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It is not in the Quran nor has it been revealed to me that elections will be held on 
October 18 and nothing will happen thereafter.… In my opinion the Presidential 
System, which is closer to Islam, is more suitable for Pakistan.… This country 
can be kept together by the armed forces and not by politicians.149 
 
Bhutto was hanged on April 4, 1979. The dramatic departure of Zulfiqar Bhutto 
from Pakistani politics was the last time that a civilian leader possessed autonomy over 
the nuclear weapons program. As Prime Minister, Bhutto worked closely with the 
scientific community to expedite nuclear proliferation. However, Bhutto’s protest of the 
results of the 1973 election triggered his disposal by COAS Zia-ul-Haq. The military 
coup d'état exhibited a failure of legitimate, democratic processes and ushered in a new 
Pakistani leader. As noted in the next chapter, President Zia-ul-Haq’s eleven years of 
leadership Islamized the armed forces and cemented the military’s dominance for the 
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CHAPTER IV- 1977-1993: MILITARY PRESIDENCY AND EXCLUSION OF 
CIVILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
 President Zia governed Pakistan from 1977 until August 17, 1988 when he died in 
a plane crash. During his eleven years in power, his greatest impact on Pakistani society 
was his emphasis on fundamentalist Islam. This often translated to an increase in 
extremism within the military ranks because higher-ranking officers recruited based on 
religious purity. This chapter examines how President Zia changed the culture of the 
Pakistani military and also discusses the variety of nuclear developments during his 
tenure. The main objective of this portion is to describe how President Zia’s term 
established the de facto military autonomy over the nuclear program that continued even 
after his death. 
As Umbreen Javid explains, President Zia caused a “forceful entry of extremist 
organization into the political life of Pakistan.”150 A concern with President Zia’s 
extremist military is that individuals who entered the force in the 1980s became highly 
ranking officers in decision-making positions in the 21st century. In the context of the 
nuclear weapons program, religious extremism in the military became a threat to the 
arsenal. As discussed in Chapter Six, there are security measures in place to ensure 
radical Islamists cannot penetrate the security of the arsenal. While Islamic extremism is 
a concern, the current stability and discipline of the Pakistani military is designed to 
counteract extremist individuals.  
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 During his rule, there were also significant advances in the Pakistani nuclear 
weapons program. By 1982, President Zia had made it clear that he trusted A.Q. Khan 
and his employees at KRL more than Munir Ahmad Khan at PAEC to produce a 
successful bomb design. His skepticism of scientists at PAEC was rooted in their 
connection to former Prime Minister Bhutto and in their Ahmadi backgrounds.151 The 
Ahmadiyya community is a Muslim minority group, though Pakistan declared them non-
Muslim in 1974.152 As a result of his discrimination, he slowly weaned the nuclear 
program away from the PAEC. To offer an excuse for his bias, President Zia suggested to 
PAEC that he “simply wanted to keep [the program] in safe custody in GHQ.”153 
One group within the PAEC, the Trigger Group, was particularly crucial to bomb 
development. The Trigger Group was responsible for designing the correct explosive lens 
structure for successful detonation. Just two weeks after the PAEC handed their designs 
over to KRL, the scientists at KRL unveiled their design. This “KRL” design matched the 
PAEC design delivered days earlier.154 A.Q. Khan and his employees at KRL were 
anxious to prove they were keeping pace with PAEC’s research and development. This 
desire likely drove them to misrepresent the PAEC’s designs as their own.  
 Despite President Zia’s bias, the PAEC nuclear program continued to progress 
more rapidly than that at KRL. Director of the PAEC, Munir Ahmad Khan, recounted in 
an interview that, “On March 11, 1983, we successfully conducted our first cold test of a 
working nuclear device. That evening, I went to General Zia with the news that Pakistan 
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was now ready to make a nuclear device.”155 Over the course of the next 12 years, the 
PAEC conducted more than twenty cold tests in the Kirana Hills, a small mountain range 
in the Punjab province.156 The PAEC tested multiple designs, all constructed by their 
scientists within the Theoretical Physics Group.157 
The following year, in 1984, A.Q. Khan proclaimed that Pakistan had achieved 
uranium enrichment at KRL. At this point, India was outpacing Pakistan 2:1 in military 
manpower, 4:1 in naval warships and 3:1 in military aircraft.158 When A.Q. Khan boasted 
that Pakistan had enrichment capability, it was likely to remind India that Pakistan was 
not far behind them in nuclear development. In an interview with the Urdu newspaper 
Nawa-I-Waqt on February 10, 1984, A.Q. Khan said that, “Pakistan has broken the 
Western countries’ monopoly on the enrichment of uranium.”159 
On September 12, 1984, American President Ronald Reagan sent a message to 
President Zia. The letter cautioned Pakistan against enriching uranium past the 5% 
threshold. To deter the Pakistanis from passing the 5% mark, President Reagan 
threatened to withdraw military aid to Pakistan.160 While uranium must be enriched to 
20% to be considered highly enriched uranium, most energy reactors require less than 5% 
of the fissile material, U-235. From the Americans’ point of view, enriching uranium past 
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the 5% threshold would have made it significantly easier to enrich to even higher 
percentages. The U.S. was ultimately concerned that Pakistan sought HEU for a nuclear 
weapons arsenal.161 
Despite President Zia’s message of peace, A.Q. Khan continued to issue 
incendiary statements threatening Pakistani proliferation. During a March 14, 1985 
interview, he emphasized that while the program was peaceful in nature, Pakistan could 
create “an atomic explosion in a very short time, if required, without conducting a 
test.”162 Two years later on January 28, 1987, Kuldip Nayar, an Indian journalist, 
interviewed A.Q. Khan. In the interview, A.Q. Khan provocatively declared that Pakistan 
could enrich uranium to weapons grade status and actually possessed a nuclear weapon. 
He affirmed that, “America knows it. What the CIA has been saying about our possessing 
the bomb is correct.”163  
At this time, India and Pakistan were embroiled in a tense crisis. In early 1986-
1987 India conducted a variety of military exercises called Operation Brasstacks. The 
exercise involved a war game named Trident. Trident required Indian troops to be 
organized in such a way that it could mobilize and split Pakistan down the middle. Under 
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the direction of President Zia, the Pakistani military responded by putting their own 
troops in position to seize the western portion of India.164  
According to U.S. military attaché estimates, “if a war had broken out, Pakistan 
would have been defeated within a month, barring Indian military incompetence or 
unilateral Indian decision to end the fighting.”165 The overwhelming Indian conventional 
superiority could have contributed to A.Q. Khan’s desire to claim Pakistan was capable 
of producing nuclear weapons. 
However, A.Q. Khan’s announcement displeased the military government. In an 
interview, President Zia’s chief of staff Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Syed Refaqat Ali 
narrated that “President Zia himself told me the next morning, ‘I have never given any 
rough treatment to any guest in my house but A.Q. Khan is the only one left trembling 
and perspiring when he left my house last evening.”166 President Zia was mostly 
concerned with the Indian response to such provocative declarations.167  
Over the next two months, President Zia forced A.Q. Khan to retract his statement 
and declare that they were taken out of context. He also transferred the bomb design 
project back to PAEC.168 President Zia claimed that the move was due to the PAEC’s 
more rapid advancement in technology and designs.169 In the coming year, the PAEC 
controlled the majority of scientific decisions and worked closely with the military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: 
Allied Publishers Private Limited, 2006), 272. 
165 Ajit K. Dasgupta, Ghandi’s Economic Thought (London: Routledge, 1996) cited in 
John E. Peters et. al, War and Escalation in South Asia (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 
2006), 30.	  
166 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, 227. 
167 Ibid., 226. 
168 Ibid., 227. 
169 Ibid., 189. 
	   56	  
government. Specifically, the Theoretical Physics Group worked towards more 
successful cold tests and improved designs.170 
President Zia’s military government collapsed on August 17, 1988 when he died 
in a controversial plane crash.171 Several members of his staff perished as well, including 
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee (CJCSC) General Akhtar Rehman. In a 
later interview, future Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said, “As the news of the 
aeropane crash was received, Ghulam Ishaq Khan took over as president. General Mirza 
Aslam Beg raised no objection and let Ghulam Ishaq Khan take charge in accordance 
with the constitution.”172 
Despite the termination of Zia’s military dictatorship, military officials continued 
to provide the nation’s de facto leadership. Shuja Nawaz discussed the political situation 
following the death of President Zia: 
By the time of Zia’s death, the country was in a state of political paralysis, with 
the army calling all the shots.… No longer would the military cede to the civil its 
constitutional role as guardian of the ideology of Pakistan. Instead, the army was 
to take on the twin mantles of guardian of both the territorial and ideological 
frontiers, a role that it was to jealously guard in the decades that followed.173  
 
On November 16, 1988, the people of Pakistani elected a new civilian leader. 
Benazir Bhutto, daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, took control of 
Pakistan just two weeks after the election. Like her father, Benazir Bhutto was a member 
of the PPP. She spent much of her young adult life in the West pursuing her education. 
She studied political science at Radcliffe College at Harvard University from 1969-1973.  
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Upon graduation, she left the United States for Oxford University in the United Kingdom 
where she continued her studies in political science.174 
Approximately a decade after graduating from Oxford, Benazir Bhutto was at the 
helm of the Pakistani government. However, her position as prime minister did not grant 
her decision-making privileges regarding the nuclear program. There is some 
disagreement as to whether Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was actually aware of nuclear 
decisions and subsequently chose to lie to the Americans about Pakistani capabilities or if 
she was excluded entirely from the nuclear decision-making process. Regardless, she 
consistently reassured the United States that Pakistan did not intend to pursue nuclear 
weapons, while in fact the reality was quite the opposite.175 
While some scholars believe that she was involved with the Pakistani weapons 
program, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto always insisted that she was omitted from 
nuclear decision-making. During an interview with NBC television in the U.S. in 1991, 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto claimed that, “the President, however, kept me in the 
dark.” In another interview with Tehran Radio in 1999, she said, “Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme had never been under the control of the political leadership.”176 The lack of 
civilian involvement was likely because the military did not concede oversight of the 
program after President Zia-ul-Haq’s death.  
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In this period, three Pakistani leaders, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan (G.I. Khan), and General Mirza Aslam Beg formed a leadership 
troika. On matters of national security, President G.I. Khan and General Beg dictated the 
decision-making process. Presidential powers in the constitution granted President G.I. 
Khan the authority to dismiss Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto at his convenience. He had 
been one of President Zia’s most valued advisors and had continued involvement with the 
nuclear program for many years. The American delegation often met with him and 
General Beg without Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. As a result, President G.I. Khan and 
General Beg exercised a monopoly over national security decision-making.177 
The month after Benazir Bhutto took power, President G.I. Khan organized a 
meeting between himself, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Chief of the Army Staff 
General Mirza Aslam Beg. Given President G.I. Khan’s exposure to nuclear doctrine, 
both Pakistani and American leadership considered him the nuclear decision-maker. He 
was likely a significant contributor to the resolution that, “in view of the global scenario, 
the regional security, and the pressing needs of economic aid [from the United States] … 
Pakistan should temporarily put a restraint on its effort.”178 
 Two months later, in March 1989, the leadership troika reinforced this decision. 
In a meeting between General Beg and President George H.W. Bush, the Pakistanis 
realized that the Americans were not relenting. Pakistan needed to adapt their nuclear 
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policy to continue receiving U.S. aid. As described by Brigadier Khan, the meeting 
outlined five essential policies: 
1) maintain the minimum force posture necessary for a credible deterrent, 2) 
refrain from conducting hot tests, 3) freeze fissile stocks at the current level, 4) 
reduce uranium enrichment to below 5 percent, 5) affirm that nuclear weapons do 
not replace conventional force capabilities.179 
 
This decision demonstrated that together, President G.I. Khan, General Beg, and 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto implemented a policy of restraint. To legitimize this new 
policy, she went before a joint session of the U.S. Congress and testified that the 
Pakistani nuclear program was not hostile in nature. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stated 
that, “I can declare that we do not possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. 
That is our policy.”180 
 The day before her speech, CIA Director William Webster presented evidence 
that challenged Benazir Bhutto’s assertions that the program was purely peaceful.  He 
provided her with tangible proof of how much the Americans knew about the weapons 
program by providing a sketch of a Pakistani bomb design. The Pakistani American 
lobbyist, Mark A. Siegel, described the briefing as “more detailed” than any briefings she 
had received from President G.I. Khan or General Beg. He added that, “it showed that the 
military was doing it behind her back.”181  
 The meeting with William Webster exposed the deeply rooted mistrust between 
the civilian leaders and the military. According to retired Brigadier Khan, civil-military 
relations only worsened over the next year:  
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As Benazir Bhutto’s relationship with the president and the army continued to 
deteriorate, the classified program became more hidden from any structural 
oversight other than direct access of the heads of PAEC and KRL to the president 
and army chief.182 
 
In a similar testament, Rajpal Bundania, an India-Pakistan scholar, discussed in 
2001 how Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto could not visit any of the nation’s nuclear 
installations during her first term. He also states that the scientific community did not 
allow any oversight by the civilian government. Bundania described Benazir Bhutto’s 
involvement with nuclear decision-making: 
The control and command of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme by non-
elected institutions—military in connivance with the ISI, the bureaucracy and the 
powerful section of nuclear scientists—certainly introduced discrepancies and 
irrationality in the formulation of country’s foreign and security policies…Most 
certainly, Pakistan’s elected institutions have at the most secondary role in the 
formulation of a country’s nuclear policy.183  
 
Less than two years after taking power, President G.I. Khan removed Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto from her position. She claimed that the Pakistani Army had 
orchestrated what amounted to a military coup d'état. In a press conference on August 8, 
1990, she alleged, “military intelligence forced the President to make this decision.” 184 
As further evidence to implicate the military in her dismissal, Benazir Bhutto cited the 
deployment of troops to television and radio stations to censor public information. She 
was also suspicious of the military’s confiscation of documents from the Intelligence 
Bureau, a counter-intelligence agency run by civilians.185 To many members of the 
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military, her allegations were offensive and untrue. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto left 
power on August 6, 1990.  
Pakistan held elections in late 1990 and the citizens elected Nawaz Sharif, leader 
of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), a rival party to the PPP. Characterized by retired 
Brigadier Khan as the “blue eyed boy” of General Zia,186 Sharif won more than a two-
thirds majority.187 Unlike Benazir Bhutto, Sharif had experience governing. During the 
duration of Benazir Bhutto’s rule, he had been the Chief Minister of the Punjab province.  
The two leaders clashed often, though Sharif claims to have “conducted several 
sessions of parlays for a compromise with her.”188 Disagreements between the two were 
to be expected considering their positions in rival parties. According to Brian Cloughley, 
a Pakistani military and political scholar, Sharif had succeeded politically because he had 
always kept “an eye over his shoulder to watch for the next political dagger thrust.”189 
Despite his governance experience, Sharif’s election came with some challenges. In the 
opinion of retired Brigadier Khan, “for the second time in five years, President G.I. Khan 
faced a prime minister with problems of bad governance—corruption, nepotism, 
inefficiencies and friction with the armed forces.”190 
Tension with the armed forces mounted when Sharif and General Beg disagreed 
about military action in Kuwait in 1990. General Beg thought it was against the national 
interest to deploy Pakistani forces to fight in the conflict. The Americans, led by 
President George H.W. Bush, were planning an offensive to expel Iraqi troops from 
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Kuwait. President Bush requested the assistance of Pakistan and, while Prime Minister 
Sharif affirmed Pakistani support for the United States, General Beg refused to mobilize 
the armed forces. Prime Minister Sharif was shocked at the COAS’ disobedience to the 
Prime Minister.  
General Beg’s euphemism for his misbehavior was called “strategic defiance.” 
His noncompliance cost him his position when President G.I. Khan forced him to step 
down and began looking for a replacement. Brian Cloughley criticized General Beg’s 
insubordination:  
Beg’s ideas had little support within Pakistan, either, although some half-baked 
ideologists seized on his apparent fervor for Islamic solidarity to push their own 
theocratic barrow…. What did the concept, possibly the new defence policy of 
Pakistan, actually mean? It had a challenging ring about it, certainly. Strategic 
Defiance: “Come the three corners of the world in arms, and we shall shock 
them.” Stirring; nationalistic; even xenophobic.191 
 
 Friction between President G.I. Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif grew 
when he bypassed Sharif’s wishes while nominating another COAS.192 President G.I. 
Khan appointed General Asif Nawaz Junga to be the new COAS, a choice that Prime 
Minister Sharif did not support.193 Sharif said in an interview that General Asif Nawaz 
“did not treat the prime minister as prime minister.”194 He also stated that, “Asif Nawaz 
knew very well that I had not recommended him. This was perhaps why [he] nursed a 
grudge against me. From Day One, he had reservations in his heart against me but I tried 
my best to get him in line with me.”195 The animosity between the Prime Minister and the 
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COAS grew when Sharif alleged that General Asif Nawaz was “so arrogant that he 
openly opposed the government and talked ill of the prime minister.”196 
 Demonstrating his frustration with General Asif Nawaz, Prime Minister Sharif 
spoke of the role of the COAS:  
His talk was so bitter whoever might be in power, he would have taken a bad 
view of him. The army chief must mind his own business. He should have 
pleasant relations with the prime minister. But alas! I found his behavior lacking 
in this respect on many occasions.197 
 
Sharif also claimed that General Asif Nawaz actively mocked him in the presence 
of other high-ranking army officials.198 The tension between Prime Minister Sharif and 
General Nawaz existed until the unexpected death of General Nawaz on January 8, 1993. 
After the death of General Nawaz, President G.I. Khan again sought a replacement. In an 
interview, Prime Minister Sharif stated that, “Ghulam Ishaq Khan appointed [General 
Waheed Kakar] without seeking my opinion. He thought it unnecessary to take my advice 
on this, despite being constitutionally bound to do so.”199 Prime Minister Sharif was once 
again frustrated with President G.I. Khan overstepping his constitutional authority. 
Meanwhile, President G.I. Khan was also exasperated with the political environment.  
 On April 18, 1993, President G.I. Khan dissolved the National Assembly and 
dismissed Prime Minister Sharif from his position. President G.I. Khan dismissed him on 
the basis of political corruption and harmful policies. An article in The Independent, a 
British newspaper, candidly described the events: 
Soldiers late last night surrounded the capital’s state-run radio and television 
station to prevent the sacked prime minister from broadcasting a final rallying cry 
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to his supporters. In minutes, Mr. Sharif went from being the most powerful 
elected official in the country to a solitary citizen, hounded and humiliated out of 
office. The President has wide powers, a vestige of Pakistan’s former military 
dictatorship, which allow him to dismiss the government and hold elections 
within 90 days.200  
 
 Prime Minister Sharif immediately appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. 
After deliberation, the courts decided that Sharif should be returned to power. The 
Supreme Court’s decision enflamed the existing friction between former Prime Minister 
Sharif and President G.I. Khan. On May 26, 1993, Sharif reclaimed power.201 Over the 
course of the next few months, the tension between President G.I. Khan and Prime 
Minister Sharif grew. The conflict between the two leaders eventually escalated to such a 
point that Army Chief General Abdul Waheed dismissed both individuals from power. In 
July of 1993, COAS Waheed demanded that both Sharif and President G.I. Khan remove 
themselves from the political environment and promised fair elections within 90 days.202   
The national elections of October 1993 returned Benazir Bhutto to the office of 
Prime Minister.203 With the election of Prime Minister Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif left office. 
President G.I. Khan also left the government. The disposal of President G.I. Khan was 
perhaps one of the most devastating developments in the history of the Pakistani nuclear 
weapons program. Brigadier Khan characterized him as “truly a veteran and the only 
person who had been consistently overseeing the program from its very beginning—
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possibly since 1972.”204 President G.I. Khan was instrumental in navigating the 
proliferation obstacles and persevered through sanctions to keep Pakistan on the road to a 
nuclear bomb. His experience and ingenuity was irreplaceable. 
 Brigadier Khan also noted an additional consequence of President G.I. Khan’s 
resignation, stating that: 
This was the first time the army had inherited the responsibility for the nuclear 
program—the result of a power breakdown at the center between the president 
and the prime minister…until that point, the role of the General Headquarters 
(GHQ) in nuclear decision-making had never been formal.205 
 
Due to the constant friction between civilian leaders, a program that had been 
initiated by a democratically elected leader was now officially in the hands of the 
professional military. From 1977-1988, President Zia-ul-Haq’s military administration 
controlled the government and the arsenal. Since his death, the military had de facto 
authority to manage the program, but 1993 was the first time that a civilian leader 
officially handed the program to the military. From 1993 onward, it worked in 
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CHAPTER V- 1993-1999: THE DECISION TO TEST A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND 
THE KARGIL WAR 
 From the point that President G.I. Khan handed control of the weapons program 
to the military in 1993, General Headquarters (GHQ) has yet to relinquish its de facto 
control of the nuclear arsenal. This chapter discusses the political environment after the 
dismissal of Prime Minister Sharif and President G.I. Khan. It will examine how the 
alternation between prime ministers likely reaffirmed the necessity of military control of 
the arsenal. The unreliability of the Pakistani political environment perpetuated during 
this time, until the military seized power in a military coup d'état at the end of the Kargil 
War in 1999.   
After the 1993 conflict between Prime Minister Sharif and President G.I. Khan, 
the people of Pakistan reelected Benazir Bhutto. President Farooq Leghari dismissed her 
government in 1996 for corruption, nepotism and violation of rules in the administration 
of the affairs of the Government.”206 The Pakistani citizens brought Nawaz Sharif back to 
office in 1997. This time, he was prime minister from early 1997 until October 12, 1999.  
After returning to power, Prime Minister Sharif augmented the powers and 
expanded the role of the Prime Minister. Frustrated by his dismissal by President G.I. 
Khan in 1993, Sharif limited the constitutional powers of the President.207 The Prime 
Minister proposed the 13th Amendment, which restricted the authority of a president to 
remove a prime minister from power. In search for institutional support within Pakistan, 
Sharif turned to Supreme Court Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah. Eventually, the struggle 
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for constitutional power led to more friction between Prime Minister, President Farooq 
Leghari, and the Supreme Court Chief Justice. The conflict left “all three dragging the 
army to their side.”208 In December of 1997, both President Leghari and Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Shah resigned.  
The friction between Prime Minister Sharif and other Pakistani institutions 
continued, weakening his relationship with the military. During his first period as prime 
minister from 1990 to 1993, Nawaz Sharif had a hostile relationship with President G.I. 
Khan and three army chiefs, General Aslam Beg, General Asif Nawaz, and General 
Abdul Waheed. After his reelection, his relationship with the military remained saturated 
with conflict and contempt. The next Chief of Army Staff (COAS) to work with Prime 
Minister Sharif was General Jehangir Karamat.   
Problems arose between Sharif and COAS Karamat when Sharif began making 
unreasonable requests of the military in 1997. According to Hassan Abbas, a Pakistani 
government official in the administrations of Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf, 
Sharif sought to use the army as a tool to operate the civilian government.209 Abbas cited 
a variety of requests from Prime Minister Sharif to General Karamat: 
Among the suggestions: use the army to patrol the [Grand Trunk] road, conduct 
surveys of schools to determine how many were actually operating with staff, and 
[help] the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) monitor its 
customers’ meters to ensure there was no pilferage.210 
 
COAS Karamat was uncomfortable with this degree of military involvement in 
civilian life. His reluctance to follow direction annoyed Prime Minister Sharif. It was the 
Prime Minister’s opinion that the civilian government created policies to be followed by 
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the military without objection. Prime Minister Sharif said that he believed “strongly that 
Government and politics is [sic] the affairs of the politicians and political parties. And the 
army has no … business to interfere with the affairs of the Government.”211 General 
Karamat refused to use the military as a pawn of the Sharif government.  
 Tension between COAS Karamat and Prime Minister Sharif continued into May 
of 1998. On May 11 and 13, India conducted five nuclear test detonations. Pakistan and 
the larger international community were taken by surprise completely. Some scholars, 
such as Michael Krepton at the Arms Control Association, argues that Pakistan should 
have anticipated an Indian test: 
Although the timing of the tests came as a surprise to the U.S. intelligence 
community, New Delhi had foreshadowed its decision to test two years earlier by 
withdrawing from the negotiating endgame for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT).212  
 
Pakistan was particularly shocked by the tests because they were conducted less 
than 100 miles from the India-Pakistan border. Prime Minister Sharif scrambled to 
respond. He embodied the sense of insecurity felt in Pakistan when he said that, “we are 
living under the dark shadow of Indian nuclear saber rattling.”213 He hinted that Pakistan 
would respond, stating that, “as a sovereign and independent nation, Pakistan will make 
its own decision on the steps to be taken towards its sovereignty and defense.”214  
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 Out of the public eye, Prime Minister Sharif held a Defense Committee Cabinet 
(DCC) meeting. The DCC was the official decision-making body of the Sharif 
government, though many believed it was an inefficient and arbitrary organization. 
Despite these opinions, the DCC successfully produced a decision for Prime Minister 
Sharif: Pakistan would respond with its own nuclear tests. He recalled the events: 
I immediately summoned the Defense Committee of Cabinet, which then met 
repeatedly. All the three chiefs of the armed services and the Chairman Joint 
Chief of Staff attended these meetings. Then I discussed the matter with the 
president and then with the heads of friendly countries. Within the country I also 
invited media as well as representatives of different walks of life to discuss the 
issue. I wanted everybody to participate…but I had made up my mind from Day 
One that what I ought to do, I would do, for we had no other option.215 
 
According to Prime Minister Sharif, both the Chief of Naval Services and General 
Karamat disagreed on the issue of testing a Pakistani device.216 The Prime Minister said 
that, “[Karamat] was of the opinion that we should not test, for America would get angry. 
However, I was of the opinion at the very beginning that we should test without accepting 
any pressure from anywhere, so I carried out the tests.”217 General Karamat recalled the 
discussion differently. He said: 
Can anybody believe that the three service chiefs would get into a DCC [meeting] 
with such an agenda without making sure that they were all on the same page? I 
was CJCSC and made sure that we had a pow wow to get our thoughts clear. 
There was never any difference in the opinion of the service chiefs—they all 
wanted to test. They all knew that under US law sanctions are mandatory and 
after such an event—we wanted the Prime Minister and others to understand this 
and we wanted an assurance that budgetary constraints post-event would not lead 
to a degradation of operational capacity—especially in Kashmir. We got this 
assurance. That was what it was all about.218 
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 Despite COAS General Karamat’s supposed hesitancy, Prime Minister Sharif 
approved a Pakistani nuclear test on May 16, 1998.  The directive went to the Director 
General of the Combat Directorate (DGCD). The Combat Directorate (CD) had been the 
core of the nuclear program from the time the military got control of it in 1993. From the 
DGCD, the instructions went to Brigadier Muhammad Anwar, director of the Special 
Works Organization (SWO), to ready the tunnels for an underground test.219 The SWO 
was responsible for constructing and maintaining the chosen test sites and deployed two 
groups of troops to separate sites.  
 The scientific community supplemented the military’s preparations with its own 
expertise. Just three days after the Prime Minister’s order to prepare sites, two teams of 
PAEC scientists departed for the test sites in Chagai. A total of 140 scientists traveled 
under the direction of Dr. Mubarakmand whose specialized group would oversee the 
tests.220 According to Shuja Nawaz, some of the tunnels had “fallen into a state of 
disrepair.”221 The tunnels were almost 20 years old, prepared during Zulfiqar Bhutto’s 
tenure and renovated in June of 1996 to withstand powerful underground explosions. 
With PAEC Chairman Ishfaq Ahmad and PAEC scientists, the military reopened and 
repaired the tunnels.222 
 In addition to the army’s logistical responsibilities, the military also mediated a 
dispute in the scientific community. The Pakistani Army had chosen a PAEC team, rather 
than one from A.Q. Khan’s KRL, to conduct the explosion because their weapon design 
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was superior and had been proven in cold tests.223 The PAEC’s scientists also had longer 
experience with the test sites, as the tunnel at Chagai was constructed and maintained by 
its engineers. The Army was far more confident that the PAEC could manage the host 
test based on its experience with cold tests and the test sites.224 However, A.Q. Khan and 
his colleagues at KRL contacted the military to convey their frustration on to Prime 
Minister Sharif. According to Shahid-ur-Rehman’s account: 
A shorter and exclusive DCC meeting convened between May 15-18 had decided 
to give a matching response to India and assign the task to PAEC. As the news 
that PAEC had been asked to prepare for the tests travelled to KRL, a furious Dr. 
Khan protested to Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat who, in turn 
rang up Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. It was decided, as a compromise, that 
members of KRL will be associated in the team preparing the site.225 
 
With the guidance of the PAEC, Prime Minister Sharif charged the Army with 
logistical preparations. Some of these responsibilities included maintaining “bunkers, 
observations posts, lodging, communications, tunnel portals, all of which were 
camouflaged using canvas and net.” The military also attempted to avoid detection of the 
test sites. Brigadier Khan describes the Army’s effort: “to deceive satellite surveillance, 
all facilities were made of adobe and constructed to resemble a local village—even the 
tunnel portal itself was located inside an adobe hut.” Brigadier Khan also described how 
“teams of soldiers were assigned the task of continually erasing vehicle tracks caused by 
incoming and outgoing trucks and jeeps.”226 
On May 28 and 30, Pakistan detonated its first nuclear devices. At 3:16pm on 
May 28, Muhammad Arshad, a PAEC engineer, pushed the button that initiated the first 
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explosion.227 Prime Minister Sharif proudly declared that, “Today, we have settled a 
score.”228 Following the tests, Prime Minister Sharif was a national celebrity. The 
domestic reaction to the tests was undeniably positive. Pakistan had demonstrated to 
India, and the world, that the nation was prepared to meet national security challenges. 
The country had achieved the most difficult technological feat in the history of weaponry. 
There were even public billboards congratulating Prime Minister Sharif for his nuclear 
feat.229 
Despite the positive reception by Pakistani citizens, the international community 
was enraged. Pakistan had confirmed the fears of the nonproliferation advocates. 
Additional concerns, such as the security of weapons and the Pakistani command and 
control structure, now arose. These concerns intensified when Prime Minister Sharif 
forced COAS General Karamat to resign less than six months after the nuclear test. 
COAS Karamat had created friction between himself and the Prime Minister 
when he publically suggested the creation of a national security council. Prime Minister 
Sharif instructed General Karamat to resign after the COAS gave a speech October 6, 
1998, at the Naval Staff College in Lahore, expressing his support of a Pakistani National 
Security Council.230 The suggestion was not entirely new; a variety of individuals in 
government and otherwise had discussed the option. The consensus was that the 
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establishment of a formal decision-making body would be beneficial to Pakistan. 
Individuals from every political party supported the idea and the Pakistani citizenry and 
media agreed with Karamat’s support of the proposal.  
 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was aggravated by General Karamat’s speech. The 
Prime Minister explained that he saw COAS Karamat’s National Security Council 
proposal “an undemocratic attempt to establish the unlawful jurisdiction of the army over 
an elected prime minister.”231 Prime Minister Sharif said: 
Everybody thought that the Prime Minister’s position had been undermined 
exactly by the statement of the Chief of Army Staff. I also felt the same and so I 
spoke to him. I said, “Jehangir Sahib, this is none of your business to give a 
statement like this. Do I ever give a statement as far as the Army’s concerned? Or 
the Army’s policies are concerned? Does the Prime Minister ever interfere into 
the affairs, or meddle into the affairs of the Army? I don’t do that.”232 
 
In an interview in 2008, Prime Minister Sharif was asked if he felt the army 
would respond adversely to COAS Karamat’s resignation. He responded that, “I think it 
was a matter of principle and one should not compromise on principles. If you start 
compromising you stand nowhere. You cannot tolerate someone ignoring the authority of 
the prime minister and trying to overstep you.”233 
 As a result of General Karamat’s resignation, Prime Minister Sharif sought a new 
COAS. His new appointment, General Pervez Musharraf, commented later on General 
Karamat’s resignation, “There was even greater resentment in the army than I had 
imagined over General Jenangir Karamat’s forced resignation … [by] an overbearing 
Prime Minister with huge parliamentary majority … [who] had been busy gathering all 
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powers in his office.”234At the time of his appointment, General Musharraf was the 
commander of the strike corps at Mangla.235 
 On October 7, 1998, Prime Minister Sharif confirmed General Musharraf for the 
position of Chief of Army Staff, though his appointment was not without controversy.236 
Many agencies, including the ISI, had attempted to discourage Prime Minister Sharif 
from appointing him. The agencies suggested that he was not “suitable” for the position 
and testified that he was “quick in taking action and could be easily roused.”237 Sharif 
later admitted the military’s Annual Confidential Reports had declared General 
Musharraf unsuited for the position. In an interview, Prime Minister Sharif stated: 
I must tell you clearly that the intelligence agencies’ recommendations were 
against the appointment of General Musharraf as army chief. Their view was that 
Musharraf was not fit for the job, because he was very hasty, liable to flare up 
quickly and a man who decides without due consideration.238 
 
 Retired Brigadier Khan suggested that Prime Minister Sharif’s appointment of 
General Musharraf was similar to Zulfiqar Bhutto’s appointment of President Zia-ul-Haq. 
Brigadier Khan notes, “Both prime ministers thought their new chiefs lacked institutional 
support and hence would remain subservient to them. But both overestimated their power 
and underestimated the institutional strength of the military.”239 According to Prime 
Minister Sharif, General Musharraf was insubordinate just six months after his 
appointment. 
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 In February 1999, Pakistani and Indian officials met at the Lahore Summit. The 
result of the summit was the Lahore Declaration. Both nations agreed to avoid a nuclear 
arms race.240 Despite the demonstration of good faith, a conventional war broke out just 
three months later. The so-called “Kargil War” began with an amassing of Kashmiri 
militants and Pakistani troops atop the ridges in the Kashmir region. The Kargil War 
began less than a year after the Pakistani tests and was the first conflict between the 
countries when both nations were nuclear-armed. 
 Pakistan maintained that the individuals at the border were mujahideen, Kashmiri 
militant fighters, and not official Pakistani troops.241 India was not fooled by the Pakistani 
effort to conceal the professional military presence. The conflict quickly escalated and 
India amassed its own troops and readied the Indian Air Force. While the tension 
developed into a war and continued to intensify, Pakistani officials worried that Pakistan 
was losing. Prime Minister Sharif wanted to withdraw troops, but refused to withdraw 
under intense bombardment from the Indian Air Force. He sought to involve the United 
States so the international community could ensure a peaceful surrender rather than a 
humiliating retreat.242  
 On July 4, 1999 Prime Minister Sharif traveled to Washington, D.C. to meet with 
President Bill Clinton. Meeting with the President Clinton on the 4th of July, American 
Independence Day, indicated the severity of the conflict. Rather than a warm reception, 
U.S. officials met Prime Minister Sharif with disturbing information: the Pakistani 
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military was readying nuclear weapons for use against India. According to Brigadier 
Khan, those “within knowledgeable circles in Pakistan … [agree] that the United States 
used the nuclear card simply to shock an already isolated prime minister into an 
unconditional withdrawal.”243  
 President Clinton presented Prime Minister Sharif with the information privately, 
without Pakistani aides. The meeting was intended to shock Prime Minister Sharif with 
potentially overstated intelligence.244 The exclusivity of the meeting also prevented him 
from consulting members of his team. According to Bruce Reidel, the only individual in 
the room except for Prime Minister Sharif and President Clinton: 
Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really 
was? Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles? 
Sharif seemed taken aback and said only that India was probably doing the 
same.… Did Sharif order the Pakistani nuclear missile force to prepare for action? 
Did he realize how crazy that was?245 
 
In a matter of hours, Prime Minister Sharif accepted President Clinton’s terms of 
an unconditional retreat. In a later interview, Prime Minister Sharif stated:  
Yes, [President Clinton] told me that nuclear warheads in Pakistan had been 
shifted from one station to another during the Kargil conflict. I was perplexed to 
hear such news from Clinton’s mouth, for I had not been informed of this. He told 
me the news was authentic that nuclear weaponry was shifted for deployment. He 
asked me why I, the Chief Executive, had not been informed. Now if the 
information was authentic, should General Musharraf carry out such a fateful 
movement without the prime minister’s consent? It might have caused irreparable 
loss to the nation and the responsibility would have been shifted to the 
government’s shoulders. Such behavior by General Musharraf was misconduct 
and totally irresponsible.246 
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 In his book, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, General Musharraf contradicted 
President Clinton’s accusations. He discussed the “myth … that we came to the brink of 
nuclear war.”247 He elaborated: 
The limits of our conventional forces were nowhere in sight, still less in danger of 
being crossed. I can also say with authority that in 1999 our nuclear capability 
was not yet operational. Merely exploding a bomb does not mean that you are 
operationally capable of deploying nuclear force in the field and delivering a 
bomb across the border over a selected target. Any talk of preparing for nuclear 
strikes is preposterous.248 
 
Other officials also supported General Musharraf’s claim that there were no 
nuclear preparations. The Director General of the Strategic Plans Division (DGSPD), the 
military organization devoted to the nuclear arsenal, was out of the country at the time of 
the supposed nuclear movements. He later asked, “would I be sitting in Switzerland if 
nuclear weapons were being readied for deployment?”249 
 Reflecting on the unilateral decision-making by General Musharraf, Prime 
Minister Sharif stated that, “as prime minister, I was not taken into confidence at all.” 
Though General Musharraf refutes this accusation in his book, Prime Minister Sharif 
claims that he was not aware the Pakistani military would be deployed along with the 
Kashmiri mujahideen.250 Prime Minister Sharif claimed to be under the impression that it 
would be the mujahideen fighting exclusively, without Pakistani ground support. The 
Prime Minister elaborated in an interview: 
Armed Forces of Pakistan are not allowed under law to deploy without prior 
approval of the Federal Government or the prime minister. They are bound to get 
clearance from the prime minister or Federal Government first. War is not fought 
only by the generals but by the entire nation. It is not an adventure limited to the 
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army rather it embraces every activity of the nation. It is necessary that the 
generals alone should not decide how to tackle an issue but the entire nation, 
including the nation’s political leadership.251 
 
In the end, the Kargil War was a blow to both the Pakistani armed forces and 
Pakistani civil-military relations. Prime Minister Sharif blamed General Musharraf for 
the almost 3,000 Pakistani casualties and reckless decision-making.252 General Musharraf 
criticized the Prime Minister for withdrawing troops when Musharraf was confident that 
the military could still salvage a victory.253 Both leaders blamed the other for losing the 
war. The efforts of Prime Minister Sharif and COAS Musharraf to gain advantage over 
each other created a toxic political environment for cohesive upper-level decision-
making.  
Both Prime Minister Sharif and General Musharraf sought autonomy and absolute 
power—a privilege impossible in Pakistan. The Army consistently assumed decision-
making responsibility, while the prime minister refused legitimate guidance from the 
military. Decisions were made within the separate institutions of the government and the 
military, and were kept undisclosed from one another. This secrecy and fragmented 
decision-making created a polluted environment for legitimate governance.  
 Prime Minister Sharif claimed that he had no choice but to dismiss General 
Musharraf for his rash and irresponsible decision-making. In the Prime Minister’s 
opinion, General Musharraf had squandered Pakistani lives in a personal attempt to bring 
international attention to Kashmir. In an interview, he was asked if he had any option 
other than dismissing General Musharraf. He responded: 
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No, I did not. You know what had been done to our prime ministers. Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto was hanged. [Muhammad Khan] Junejo was dismissed and Benazir 
[Bhutto’s] governments were terminated. When such excess had been inflicted 
upon prime ministers, do you think they should not create hindrances in the way 
of the generals for the sake of people’s rights, for the dignity of the prime minister 
ship [sic], for the glory of the public mandate? They must resist.254 
 
 On October 12, 1999, Prime Minister Sharif dismissed General Musharraf as 
COAS, but appointed him as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC). This 
appointment was meant to satisfy Musharraf and his supporters within the military while 
removing him from the COAS position. General Musharraf was not fooled by Sharif’s 
attempt to dishonor him and punish the military for their loss in Kashmir. Though he was 
in Sri Lanka at the time, General Musharraf intended to immediately return to Pakistan. 
Fearing a military coup by the incensed COAS, Prime Minister Sharif demanded that the 
civil aviation authorities prohibit General Musharraf’s plane from landing. Unfortunately 
for the Prime Minister, airport officials permitted the reentrance of General Musharraf 
into Pakistan.255 
 Upon his arrival, General Musharraf staged a military coup and became President 
Musharraf. According to Prime Minister Sharif, “the moment we decided to replace 
Musharraf, the army occupied the TV station and the Prime Minister’s House. The army 
cannot move so swiftly without prior planning; all the soldiers were armed and ready.”256 
The military took control of the nation’s television stations to prevent counter-messaging 
by Prime Minister Sharif. Brigadier Javed Malik, the military secretary to the Prime 
Minister, gave further details in an interview: 
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At the TV station we saw a military vehicle, with two soldiers seated, stationed in 
the porch.… I went up to the major. He was from the 111 Brigade, under Satti’s 
command. I asked him whether he recognized me. He said he knew me and I was 
the MS to the prime minister. I said, ‘Listen, the prime minister has ordered you 
to stop interfering in the functioning of TV and tell your troops to surrender.’ 
However, they seemed all out to kill me.257 
 
 On October 17, 1999, President Musharraf and aides, including Brigadier Khan, 
went to the headquarters of Pakistan Television (PTV) to outline the new leader’s plans 
for Pakistan.258 In the words of Brigadier Khan, this military coup was unique from others 
in Pakistani history because “Pakistan had become a de facto nuclear power, and nuclear 
powers have norms and constitutional practices to effect political transitions.”259 At the 
PTV headquarters, he spoke on air: 
My fellow Pakistanis, as you are aware I took over in extremely unsual 
circumstances—not of my making. It is unbelievable and indeed unfortunate that 
few at the helm of affairs in the last government were intriguing to destroy the last 
institution of stability left in Pakistan by creating dissention in the ranks of the 
armed forces of Pakistan. And who would believe that the Chief of Army Staff, 
having represented Pakistan in Sri Lanka, upon his return was denied landing in 
his own country and instead circumstances were created which would have forced 
our plane either to land in India or crash. Providence ultimately intervened.260 
 
 President Musharraf also spoke of nuclear restraint with India. Indicating his 
continued support for arms control, President Musharraf asserted that, “while preserving 
its vital security interests Pakistan will continue to pursue a policy of nuclear and missile 
restraint and sensitivity to global non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.”261 Over 
the course of the next ten years, President Musharraf implemented a variety of measures 
to improve security of the Pakistani arsenal. While President Musharraf oversaw 
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improvements in the nuclear program, the military coup d’état was a setback for 
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CHAPTER VI- NUCLEAR COMMAND INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
The Pakistani nuclear program was born from the vision of a civilian leader and 
came to fruition due to the relentless work of the Pakistani scientific community. The 
military entered the process to produce delivery systems and to provide the logistical 
support needed to test the weapons. The troika of a civilian leader’s ambition, the 
scientific community’s ingenuity, and the military’s support produced an operational 
deterrent. After the 1999 military takeover, President Musharraf directed all aspects of 
the program. This chapter discusses the formation of a new nuclear decision-making 
body called the National Command Authority (NCA). While the Prime Minister is the 
chairman and therefore possesses de jure control, the military retains de facto control of 
the arsenal. 
Prior to Musharraf’s military takeover, the national security decision-making 
body in Pakistan was the Defense Committee of Cabinet (DCC). Though the DCC was 
the organization that supported Prime Minister Sharif’s decision to test Pakistani nuclear 
devices, it was mostly uninvolved in nuclear decisions. Many critics of the DCC pointed 
to its membership body as an obstacle to efficient decision-making. Ministers of the 
Pakistani provinces and the opposition leader of the National Assembly were among the 
members, reducing the DCC’s ability to debate highly compartmentalized nuclear 
decisions.262 Two other organizations, the National Nuclear Command Authority and the 
National Nuclear Command Committee, were established in 1975 to contribute to 
strategic decision-making.263 
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Despite the existence of these organizations, Pervez Musharraf sought a more 
cohesive decision-making body. In order to provide secure command and control, 
Musharraf established the National Command Authority (NCA) in 2000. Composed of 
both civilian and military representatives, the intent was to keep nuclear decision-making 
in the hands of high-ranking military officers and civilian leaders. The NCA is a forum 
where top leaders can discuss nuclear issues and is designed to ensure that no high-
ranking official is excluded from the decision-making process. Musharraf proposed that 
the President chair the organization and that the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, the Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Director General of the 
Strategic Plans Division (SPD) be included as members.264 In total, five civilian and five 
military leaders were given the opportunity to discuss and debate topics.  
 Even among the civilian representatives, however, there has been friction. In 
2009, the Standing Committee on Defense proposed the National Command Authority 
Bill that called for the same organizational structure as originally suggested in 2000 by 
Musharraf.265 In both bills, the President was chairman and the Prime Minister was vice 
chairman. In 2009, however, President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza 
Gillani disagreed over who should nominally chair the organization. President Zardari 
elected to resign as chairman and allowed the Prime Minister to head the NCA.266 Many 
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believe he was ceding to political pressure. As a result, the new structure of the 
organization became law in January of 2010.  
 That same month, in its 16th meeting, the NCA met for the first time under the 
democratically elected leadership of Prime Minister Gillani.267 Under the new bill, the 
Prime Minister became the chairman, and other members include the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the 
Director General of the SPD. President Zardari’s decision to remove himself as chairman 
created an imbalance of four civilian leaders to five military officers within the NCA. As 
a result, the organization revised its membership to include the Minister for Finance. 
 Two committees compose the NCA: the Employment Control Committee and the 
Development Control Committee. The Employment Control Committee is responsible for 
developing nuclear policy and would supervise weapon employment in the case of a 
nuclear event. The foreign minister is the deputy chairman. The ECC’s members include 
the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Chairman of the JCSC, and three civilian 
leaders, Minister for Defense, Minister for Interior and Minister for Finance. The ECC’s 
secretary is the Director General of the SPD.268 According to Pakistani nuclear scholar 
Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 
[The ECC is] primarily responsible for policymaking regarding Pakistan’s 
employment of its nuclear deterrent. This includes defining those threats to 
national interests and security that warrant the possible threat or use of nuclear 
weapons. Formally responsible for the identification of threats and formulation of 
contingencies to deal with the perceived threats, the SPD assists the ECC in its 
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preparatory work and makes recommendations to be put before the ECC and the 
NCA.269 
 
 According to Brigadier Khan, the Development Control Committee (DCC) 
“exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organizations 
associated with the development and modernization of nuclear weapons and their means 
of delivery.”270 The defining characteristic of the DCC is that it is exclusively a scientific 
and military organization, with no civilian members apart from the civilian chairman.271 
The DJCSC is the deputy chairman of the committee and the members include the Chief 
of the Army Staff, Chief of the Naval Staff and Chief of the Air Staff. Like the ECC, the 
Director General of the SPD is the DCC’s secretary.272 The DCC also contains the 
directors of a variety of scientific organizations and laboratories such as the PAEC and 
KRL.273 
The NCA’s secretariat, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is the military 
organization tasked with implementing NCA policies, protecting the arsenal, and 
supervising the development of new technologies.274 The Director General is appointed 
by the Prime Minister and is typically a three-star general and an ex-officio member-
secretary of the NCA. The SPD headquarters comprises of approximately 70 officers 
from the Pakistani Army, Navy, and Air Force. It contains four directorates: 1) 
Operations and Planning, 2) Command, Control, Communications and Computerization, 
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Intelligence and Information and Surveillance and Reconnaissance, 3) Strategic Weapons 
Development, and 4) Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs.275  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the National Command Authority 
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To ensure proper management of the arsenal, the SPD oversees a division that 
provides security for nuclear installations, weapons, and delivery systems at both 
laboratory and storage sites. A two-star general leads the security division’s 10,000 
personnel. Some estimates claim the SPD’s force is as high as 20,000 individuals.276 Its 
directorates include Security, Technical, Counter Intelligence and Personnel Reliability 
Program, Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), and the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission (PAEC), as well as related organizations such as Space and Upper 
Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).277 
International skepticism about Pakistani nuclear management stems largely from 
the proliferation network established and sustained by A.Q. Khan, a KRL scientist. 
Brigadier Khan, writes that, “in the past, Pakistan lacked oversight over its covert nuclear 
program, leading to the A.Q. Khan network and other mishaps. But today SPD has a firm 
hold of Pakistan’s nuclear organization and policy.”278 After the embarrassment of the 
A.Q. Khan scandal, the SPD continued its efforts to prevent proliferation and to limit the 
potential for unauthorized activity within the nuclear program.  
The SPD’s security measures are intended to prevent insider collusion, 
unauthorized launches, or the theft of material. A variety of personnel reliability 
programs also exist to protect the arsenal against any radical extremists in high-ranking 
positions. Some of these individuals could have been recruited during President Zia’s era. 
Despite the worry that they could compromise the security of the arsenal, the SPD’s 
measures are supposed to ensure that only qualified individuals within the NCA can 
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make nuclear decisions. For example, Pakistani policy is supposedly designed so that no 
single individual can deploy a weapon either by technical manipulation or by verbal 
command.279  
Analysts disagree about whether the nation uses a dual-key system or a three-man 
rule. Under a dual-key system, two distinct codes are necessary for employment. One of 
these codes would come from a civilian leader and the other from a military officer. This 
system would reflect the Pakistani desire to incorporate civilian actors in the process. 
Another likely scenario is that Pakistan employs a three-man rule. In this case, three 
people, the prime minister, president and another unidentified individual, would be 
present to arm a weapon.280 A hybrid of the two scenarios suggests that a two-man rule 
would be necessary to deploy nuclear weapons, whereas a three-man rule would be 
required for launch authorization.281 Regardless of which method Pakistan employs, the 
system is meant to ensure that only legitimate orders, authorized by the NCA, can be 
issued to launch nuclear weapons.  
 Despite the effort to maintain equal civilian and military input into nuclear issues, 
many analysts agree that the military possesses de facto control of decision-making. 
According to Hans Born, “the military’s representatives are in a majority in all three 
bodies and therefore play a dominant role in the overall formulation of Pakistan’s nuclear 
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strategy.”282 In an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, analysts 
conclude “in practice, the military would probably prevail on nuclear decision-making 
during wartime or a military crisis.”283 In an interview with the author, Brigadier Khan 
described the nuclear command infrastructure under Prime Minister Sharif: 
Nawaz Sharif is fine with [telling the military that with] the nuclear weapons, 
‘you do what you want to do.’ The way the architecture of the nuclear 
management in Pakistan has been created, theoretically provides and legally 
empowers the prime minister for oversight. He can do inspections if he wants, he 
can do it whatever way he wants, but it’s a policy decision by him that he wanted 
to absolve that responsibility or abrogate that to the military.284 
 
Due to its familiarity with the arsenal, the military is the institution most 
competent to safeguard, transport and employ nuclear assets. The civilian government 
understands that it is less prepared than the military to address nuclear issues. As 
Brigadier Khan explained: 
Since 2008, two democratic transitions have happened. Since the military left 
leadership, the political leadership seems to be satisfied with the existing NCA 
system. The reason for this is the political leadership have other problems and 
they do not believe that military oversight of the program should be a priority to 
them at this time. Furthermore, this issue is too complex for the ability of the 
political administration to handle. Therefore, they are happy with the de facto 
management while retaining de jure control.285 
 
Brigadier Khan drew a distinction between wartime and peacetime control. 
Currently, the Pakistani military possesses de facto control. However, he believes that 
command and control could shift during a wartime scenario. He states, “In a wartime 
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scenario, the military would not risk deploying a nuclear weapon without civilian 
leadership. It would want the civilian leadership to signoff.”286 
However, during peacetime, the military maintains control. As a professional 
institution, the military has the distinct advantage of extensive experience with the 
nuclear arsenal. As a result, officers who are familiar with nuclear doctrine can influence 
political decisions within the NCA. Some scholars, such as Mark Fitzpatrick, even assert 
that, “although the prime minister nominally chairs the NCA, in practice the military is in 
charge.”287 According to Cheema, 
It is unrealistic to expect democratically elected, accountable and fully 
authoritative civilian governance over the country’s nuclear weapons in the near 
term…. For the foreseeable future, governance of nuclear weapons in Pakistan 
will be overseen in principle if not by practice by a mixture of civilian political 
and military leaders … but as one of the only, if not the only strong institutions 
able to provide stability and control in Pakistan, the military will retain its 
traditionally dominant influence over many if not most aspects of nuclear 
weapons strategy and use.288 
 
Some analysts worry that the military’s capability to act unilaterally, in absence of 
civilian approval, challenges the integrity of Pakistani command and control. While it is 
correct that the Pakistani military has physical control of the arsenal, many Pakistani 
military officials insist this fact should not be a cause for alarm. Nuclear weapons are of 
highest importance to the Pakistani military, as they provide for the survival of the nation 
and are the country’s ultimate deterrent. In the words of Cheema, “the professionalism of 
the Pakistani military will function as a stabilizing force and that effective military 
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control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons seems to be guaranteed.”289 In an interview with 
the author, Brigadier Khan elaborated. He stated that, “if the military does not know how 
to do custody, security, or protection [of the nuclear arsenal], no other organization is 
capable. The Pakistani military and the SPD are designed to do custodial control of the 
nuclear program.”290 
Despite the institutional strength of the military, civilian involvement in strategic 
decisions must be increased to improve the legitimacy of nuclear policymaking. The 
Pakistani parliament remains almost entirely excluded from the nuclear decisions. 
According to Hans Born: 
Pakistan’s parliament was regularly dissolved and dismissed during periods of 
military rule and has become incapable of providing an effective democratic 
counterbalance to the military-led executive…. Although the prime minister does 
remain accountable to parliament, the legislature has never debated the 
development, deployment or employment of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.291 
  
Increased parliamentary involvement would most likely involve a budgetary 
oversight role for the Pakistani parliament. Many analysts point to the United States as a 
model for parliamentary involvement regarding nuclear issues.292 With budgetary 
oversight capability, the legislature can maintain some input without interfering on 
strategic decision-making. As previously cited, Prime Minister Sharif has said that, “war 
is not fought only by the generals but by the entire nation. It is not an adventure limited to 
the army rather it embraces every activity of the nation.”293 Since the Pakistani parliament 
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represents the interests of the citizens, it should be involved, in some capacity, in nuclear 
oversight. 
Hans Born and Bates Gill also mention the role of the scientific community as a 
check on military decision-making. They state: 
The scientific community related to the nuclear programme can play an important 
role in developing, maintaining and exercising oversight over the safety of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. In this sense, it can be seen as a 
countervailing power against military dominance.294 
 
The scientific community was the backbone of the nuclear program from its 
inception. The scientific community supported nuclear decisions throughout Pakistani 
history including the decision to build weapons and hot test them. The scientific 
community’s participation was constantly sought during these developments. The 
organization’s scientists are certainly among the most knowledgeable individuals to 
comment on the program’s assets and development. Though the scientific community is 
not officially involved in NCA function, it is likely to advise nuclear decision-making the 
case of a nuclear event. 
 The scientific community, like parliament, has no official role in nuclear 
decisions. Increasing participation from both institutions, and the civilian government, 
would contribute additional layers of oversight to decision-making. Although a civilian 
leader initiated the nuclear program, Zulfiqar Bhutto’s rule is likely the only time that a 
civilian leader had autonomy over nuclear decision-making. Civilian involvement is 
likely restricted by the military’s logistical control of the weapons and the its long-
standing experience with the program. Though the NCA’s structure requires civilian 
participation, the military possesses de facto control of the Pakistani arsenal and the 
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civilian leadership is aware of this reality. Due to the volatile political environment, 
civilian and military institutions within Pakistan agree that the military is the most 
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CONCLUSION 
  
The only period that a civilian leader possessed autonomous control over the 
nuclear program was during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s administration. It was Prime Minister 
Bhutto’s resolute pursuit of a deterrent that launched the nuclear weapons program. He 
initiated the program despite the warnings of his former boss, military leader President 
Ayub Khan, against proliferation. During Prime Minister Bhutto’s rule from 1971-1977, 
he had comprehensive power over the program. He appointed Munir Ahmed Khan to be 
PAEC Chairman and brought scientist A.Q. Khan to Pakistan to expedite nuclear 
development.  
Though a civilian leader initiated the nuclear program, the military’s de facto 
control of the arsenal began during President Zia-ul-Haq’s government from 1977-1988. 
His military autocracy allowed the armed forces to infiltrate every aspect of program 
development. During this time, the military became familiar with nuclear management. 
Even after his death, the military did not surrender control of the arsenal.  
The unstable political environment in the following years reinforced the military’s 
control of the arsenal. From 1988 until 1999, Pakistani leadership alternated between 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto claimed that the Chief of Army Staff and President excluded her from the nuclear 
decision-making process.295 Both she and Prime Minister Sharif experienced meetings 
with American officials that revealed U.S. intelligence about the Pakistani military acting 
without civilian consent. While these meetings perhaps included overstated intelligence 
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leveraged by the U.S., the inability of the prime ministers to either deny or confirm the 
information demonstrated their detachment from the nuclear program.  
In 1993, during a particularly tumultuous period, COAS General Waheed 
dismissed both Prime Minister Sharif and President G.I. Khan. The nuclear program lost 
an irreplaceable expert with invaluable experience when President G.I. Khan left the 
political scene. Before his departure, he officially passed control of the nuclear program 
to the military, though it already possessed de facto control.296 President G.I. Khan did 
not trust the nuclear program to the chaotic political environment. He had confidence in 
the stability of the military and the continuity it provided across various political terms.297  
In 1999, the Kargil War exposed the profound animosity and mistrust between the 
democratically elected leaders and military officials. Prime Minister Sharif and COAS 
General Musharraf both blamed one another for the embarrassing Pakistani defeat and 
resulting casualties.298 American officials undermined Prime Minister Sharif’s legitimacy 
by alleging that the military was transporting nuclear warheads without his authorization. 
Shortly after the end of the war, COAS General Musharraf initiated a military coup d'état 
and overthrew Prime Minister Sharif.  
 During President Musharraf’s term, he approved the creation of the National 
Command Authority, the civil-military organization that determines nuclear policy. The 
military’s Strategic Plans Division is the NCA’s secretariat and the steward of the nuclear 
program.299 The sole responsibility of the SPD is management of the nuclear weapons 
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program, the country’s ultimate national security instrument.300 The Prime Minister is the 
chairman of the NCA and oversees the NCA’s two committees, the DCC and the ECC. 
The ECC contains equal civilian and military representation, while the DCC is 
exclusively a scientific-military body.301  
The conglomeration of civilian leaders, military officials and scientific advisors 
within the NCA complicates the question: “Who pushes the nuclear button?” The Prime 
Minister, a civilian, retains de jure authority as the chairman of the NCA.302 However, the 
disproportionate representation of military officials within the NCA, coupled with the 
SPD’s role as the nuclear steward, skews the balance of power towards the armed forces. 
Therefore, while the structure of the NCA incorporates both civilian and military leaders 
into the nuclear decision-making process, the military has logistical and de facto control 
of the arsenal.303   
In the early history of Pakistan, the military saw itself as the nation’s guardian 
against internal threats and Indian aggression. It has since developed into a multi-
functional enterprise that dictates Pakistani decision-making. The repeated failure of the 
civilian government to produce legitimate, sustainable democracy led to the military’s de 
facto control of the arsenal. The military’s pervasive presence in Pakistani society and its 
logistical management of the arsenal make it the most competent institution control the 
nuclear weapons program.  
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